

Temptation, Certainty Effect, and Diminishing Self-Control*

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Abstract

Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) provide a model of temptation and self-control. In a theory of choice under risk, experimental evidence suggests a “certainty effect”, that is, a decision maker tends to put more weight on a certain object in comparison with a lottery that is very likely but not completely certain. Thus what is certain may be more tempting, in other words, randomization may make objects less tempting. However, one of the axioms of Gul and Pesendorfer, called Independence, is not consistent with such a hypothesis. We provide an axiomatic model that can account for intuitive choice behavior under risk and temptation.

Keywords: temptation, self-control, preference for commitment, lottery, independence axiom, certainty effect.

JEL classification: D81

1 Introduction

1.1 Objective

In a two-period setting, Gul and Pesendorfer [6] (Hereafter GP) model a decision maker who may be tempted by ex ante inferior items. That is, in the second period, the decision maker faces a conflict between two different perspectives - one is an ex ante ranking of items (what she should choose), and the other is a temptation ranking (what she would

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like to choose now). She may be able to resist temptation and choose an item which is desirable in terms of the ex ante ranking. Alternatively, she may not be able to exercise self-control and end up with choosing ex ante inferior items.

GP consider preference over menus of lotteries to rationalize the above story. Let C be a compact metric space of outcomes and $\Delta(C)$ be the set of lotteries over outcomes. Preference \succsim is defined over non-empty compact subsets (called menus) of $\Delta(C)$, denoted by $\mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$. GP provide an axiomatic foundation for the following representation: There exist mixture linear utility functions $u, v : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that \succsim over $\mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$ is represented by

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right). \quad (1)$$

The function u represents the DM's commitment preference and hence reflects her normative ranking of alternatives, while v is interpreted as the temptation ranking. The DM behaves as if she makes a choice so as to reconcile those two factors.

Since Allais [1] and Kahneman and Tversky [9], an experimental evidence, called ‘‘certainty effect’’, is well-known. A decision maker tends to put more weight on a certain object in comparison with a lottery that is very likely but not completely certain. Thus in decision making under risk and temptation we may hypothesize that what is certain is more tempting, in other words, randomization may make objects less tempting. However, GP's model does not accommodate such a hypothesis because it may violate one of their axiom, called Independence. Our objective is to weaken Independence so as to explain intuitive choice behavior under risk and temptation.

When C is finite, we axiomatize preference having the following representation: There exist mixture linear utility functions $u, v : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and a continuous, strictly increasing and (weakly) convex function $\varphi : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ with $\varphi(0) = 0$ such that \succsim over $\mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$ is represented by

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right). \quad (2)$$

As in GP, u and v are interpreted as commitment ranking and as temptation ranking, respectively. If $\varphi(w) = w$, this functional form is reduced to GP's model (1). Convexity of φ means that the marginal cost of self-control is increasing, whereas it is constant in GP's model. We show also uniqueness of the representation.

1.2 Motivating Example

Let C_t be a consumption set in a single period. There are two periods and let $C_1 \times C_2$ be the set of lifetime consumptions. For some $\gamma > \alpha > 0$, consider the following ranking over menus of consumption streams:

$$\{(c, c + \gamma)\} \succ \{(c + \alpha, c), (c, c + \gamma)\} \sim \{(c + \alpha, c)\}. \quad (3)$$

The first half of this ranking suggests that the DM prefers the delayed but greater consumption $(c, c + \gamma)$ to the immediate but smaller consumption $(c + \alpha, c)$, but is tempted by the immediate consumption. Moreover, the second half of the ranking reveals that she cannot exercise self-control and end up with picking up $(c + \alpha, c)$ out of $\{(c + \alpha, c), (c, c + \gamma)\}$.

Suppose that the DM is more tempted by objects obtained with certainty. Let $(c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c$ denote the lottery assigning $c + \alpha$ and c with even chance. The lottery $(c + \gamma)\frac{1}{2}c$ is defined similarly. That is,

$$(c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c \equiv \begin{bmatrix} c + \alpha & 1/2 \\ c & 1/2 \end{bmatrix}, \text{ and } (c + \gamma)\frac{1}{2}c \equiv \begin{bmatrix} c + \gamma & 1/2 \\ c & 1/2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Even if $((c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c, c)$ is chosen, the DM may end up with low consumption level c in period 1. Thus $((c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c, c)$ is less tempting than $(c + \alpha, c)$. Now the DM may be able to exercise self-control, and choose $(c, (c + \gamma)\frac{1}{2}c)$ over $((c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c, c)$. That is, the following ranking seems intuitive:

$$\left\{ \left(c, (c + \gamma)\frac{1}{2}c \right) \right\} \succ \left\{ \left((c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c, c \right), \left(c, (c + \gamma)\frac{1}{2}c \right) \right\} \succ \left\{ \left((c + \alpha)\frac{1}{2}c, c \right) \right\}. \quad (4)$$

Keren and Roelofsma [10] report an experimental evidence supporting the above hypothesis. Following the first column (corresponding to $p = 1$) of Table 1, 82% of the subjects prefers the consumption stream $(\$100, 0)$ to $(0, \$110)$, though most of the subjects exhibit preference reversal when consumption takes place in the remote future. Taking $c = \$0$, $\alpha = \$100$ and $\gamma = \$110$, this experimental evidence is consistent with ranking (3). Furthermore, following the third column (corresponding to $p = 0.5$), 61% of the subjects prefers the lottery $(0, \$110\frac{1}{2}\$0)$ to $(\$100\frac{1}{2}\$0, 0)$ even though immediate consumption may be possible by choosing $(\$100\frac{1}{2}\$0, 0)$. This finding is consistent with ranking (4).

| | $p = 1$ | $p = 0.9$ | $p = 0.5$ |
|---------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|
| $\$100$ now | 0.82 | 0.54 | 0.39 |
| $\$110$ in 4 weeks | 0.18 | 0.46 | 0.61 |
| $\$100$ in 26 weeks | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.33 |
| $\$110$ in 30 weeks | 0.63 | 0.75 | 0.67 |

Figure 1: Experimental evidence from Keren and Roelofsma [10]

However, rankings (3) and (4) are not consistent with Independence in Gul and Pesendorfer [6] that requires, for all menus x, y , and z ,

$$x \succ y \Rightarrow \lambda x + (1 - \lambda)z \succ \lambda y + (1 - \lambda)z. \quad (5)$$

Indeed, notice that each menu appearing in ranking (4) is obtained by mixing $\{(c, c)\}$ and the corresponding menu in ranking (3) with even weight. Thus Independence together with

ranking (3) must imply

$$\left\{ \left(c, (c + \gamma) \frac{1}{2} c \right) \right\} \succ \left\{ \left((c + \alpha) \frac{1}{2} c, c \right), \left(c, (c + \gamma) \frac{1}{2} c \right) \right\} \sim \left\{ \left((c + \alpha) \frac{1}{2} c, c \right) \right\}.$$

Thus Independence excludes the possibility that objects obtained with certainty are more tempting, in other words, randomization may make objects less tempting.

1.3 Related Literature

Several authors provide models of temptation without Independence. Gul and Pesendorfer [7] consider preference over finite menus of deterministic items, derive a temptation ranking from the preference, and characterize a representation. Epstein and Kopylov [3] adapt GP's model to explain cognitive dissonance. By extending choice objects to menus of acts, they characterize a functional form with a convex temptation utility.

Noor [12], Nehring [11], Olszewski [13], and Dillenberger and Sadowski [2] provide foundations for functional forms closely related to ours. Noor [12] points out that the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) is not compelling under temptation. To accommodate choice behavior without WARP, he considers preference over menus of lotteries, as in GP, and provides a menu-dependent self-control model as follows:

$$U(x) = \lim_{k \rightarrow \kappa(x)} \left[\max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) + k \left(v(l) - \max_{l' \in x} v(l') \right) \right) \right], \quad (6)$$

where u and v are expected utility functions on $\Delta(C)$ and $\kappa : \mathcal{K}(\Delta(C)) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\}$ is a lower semicontinuous function. Since our set of axioms is stronger than his, the preference we consider should also admit a representation of the form (6). Notice that our model also admits menu-dependent self-control even under the stronger axioms.

Nehring [11] considers "second-order preference" over extended outcomes (c, P) , where c is an element of a finite outcome set C and P is a linear order on C . For a menu $x \subset C$, let $P(x)$ denote a P -maximal element in x . His model can induce preference over menus of outcomes as

$$U(x) = \max_{P \in \mathcal{L}(C)} V(P(x), P),$$

where $\mathcal{L}(C)$ is the set of all linear orders on C and V is a representation of the second-order preference. His model can accommodate a nonlinear generalization of GP's model. He mentions the same functional form as (2) as a special case of his model.

By considering preference over pairs of a finite menu x and a deterministic item l included in x , Olszewski [13] characterizes a functional form over the pairs (x, l) , which induces the representation over menus as follows:

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - c \left(l, \max_{l' \in x} r(l, l') \right) \right), \quad (7)$$

where c satisfies $c(l, r(l, l)) = 0$. Our functional form is a special case of (7).

To explain seemingly altruistic behavior, Dillenberger and Sadowski [2] model a DM who avoids a feeling of shame from behaving selfishly when observed by someone else. They consider preference over finite menus of pairs $(a_1, a_2) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$, where a_1 and a_2 are interpreted as payoffs of the DM and of the (potentially anonymous) other player. The functional form they consider is

$$U(x) = \max_{a \in x} \left(u(a_1) - g \left(a, \max_{b \in x} \varphi(b) \right) \right),$$

where $u : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $\varphi : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ are continuous and strictly increasing, and $g : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \times \varphi(\mathbb{R}_+^2) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfies a certain property. The components u and φ capture “selfish utility” and “fairness utility”, respectively.

Fudenberg and Levine [5] take a different approach for modeling a self-control problem. They directly assume a long-run patient self and a sequence of short-run impulsive selves as primitives, and show that the equilibria of the game played by those selves can be regarded as the solution to a maximization problem. Though they have more general models, we focus on the case that the cost of self-control is convex. In our terminology, it can be expressed as the functional form

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \gamma \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right)^\theta \right), \quad (8)$$

where $\gamma > 0$ and $\theta > 1$. Some experimental findings suggest that self-control is a limited resource, that is, a DM tends not to resist temptation as cognitive load increases. Their model (8) can explain those evidence. Fudenberg and Levine also point out that Independence in GP, and hence the linear cost of self-control, is not compelling when lotteries are taken as choice objects.

Halevy [8] provides an intertemporal choice model under risk, and explains the experimental findings of Keren and Roelofsma [10] by a dynamically inconsistent model.

2 Model

2.1 Domain

Let C be a compact metric space and $\Delta(C)$ be the set of all probability measures over C . Under the weak convergence topology, $\Delta(C)$ is a compact and metric space. Denote the metric by $d(l, l')$ for $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$.

Let $\mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$ be the set of all non-empty compact subsets of $\Delta(C)$. Endow $\mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$ with the Hausdorff metric. That is, for all $x, x' \in \mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$, let

$$d_h(x, x') \equiv \max \left[\max_{l \in x} \min_{l' \in x'} d(l, l'), \max_{l' \in x'} \min_{l \in x} d(l, l') \right].$$

Preference \succsim is defined on $\mathcal{D} \equiv \mathcal{K}(\Delta(C))$.

2.2 Convex Self-Control Representation

Take continuous mixture linear utility functions $u, v : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and a continuous, strictly increasing and (weakly) convex function $\varphi : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ with $\varphi(0) = 0$. We consider the functional form $U : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined by

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right). \quad (9)$$

Components u and v are interpreted as in GP. When committed to a lottery $l \in \Delta(C)$, the DM evaluates $\{l\}$ by $U(\{l\}) = u(l)$. Thus u is commitment ranking of lotteries. On the other hand, the function v is supposed to represent the DM's temptation ranking of lotteries. Taking into account the most tempting lottery within a menu at hand, the DM evaluates the menu by maximizing commitment utility $u(l)$ minus self-control cost $\varphi(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l))$. Since φ is convex, a self-control cost increases drastically as the difference between $\max_x v$ and $v(l)$ increases. In case of GP, $\varphi(w) = w$, and hence the difference, $\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l)$, is directly interpreted as the self-control cost from choosing l when confronted with the most tempting lottery.

Definition 2.1. Preference \succsim on \mathcal{D} admits a convex self-control representation if there exists a functional form (9) with components (u, v, φ) that represents \succsim . Furthermore, \succsim is said to admit a partial convex self-control representation if a functional form (9) represents \succsim but φ is convex only on a non-degenerate interval $[0, \bar{w}]$.

Ex post choice suggested by a convex self-control model is

$$\mathcal{C}(x) = \arg \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right). \quad (10)$$

Since φ is convex, ex post preference over lotteries is concave in l . Thus choice structure captured by (10) may accommodate Allais-type behavior or certainty effect. Furthermore, unlike GP, the ex post preference depends on the most tempting item in x , and hence exhibits menu-dependent self-control.

Recall the motivating example in the Introduction. A convex self-control model can explain rankings (3) and (4). Let $C = C_1 \times C_2$, where C_1 and C_2 are identical. Abusing notation, let $u, v : C_t \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be instantaneous vNM indices. Let $\varphi : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is a strictly increasing convex function with $\varphi(0) = 0$. Suppose that, under commitment, the DM evaluates a consumption stream (c_1, c_2) by $u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2)$, where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor. Suppose also that temptation comes from the immediate consumption only, that is, $v(c_1)$ is the temptation utility from the consumption stream (c_1, c_2) . The DM has a preference relation on \mathcal{D} represented by

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left\{ \int (u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2)) dl - \varphi \left(\max_{l' \in x} \int v(c_1) dl'_1 - \int v(c_1) dl_1 \right) \right\},$$

where l_1 denotes the marginal distribution of l on C_1 .

The indifference relation in ranking (3) implies that, when facing the menu $\{(c + \alpha, c), (c, c + \gamma)\}$, the utility from choosing $(c + \alpha, c)$ over $(c, c + \gamma)$ is greater than the other way around, that is,

$$u(c + \alpha) + \beta u(c) > u(c) + \beta u(c + \gamma) - \varphi(v(c + \alpha) - v(c)).$$

Equivalently,

$$\varphi(v(c + \alpha) - v(c)) > \beta(u(c + \gamma) - u(c)) - (u(c + \alpha) - u(c)). \quad (11)$$

On the other hand, ranking (4) implies that

$$\begin{aligned} & pu(c + \alpha) + (1 - p)u(c) + \beta u(c) \\ & < u(c) + p\beta u(c + \gamma) + (1 - p)\beta u(c) - \varphi(pv(c + \alpha) + (1 - p)v(c) - v(c)), \end{aligned}$$

that is,

$$\frac{1}{p}\varphi(p(v(c + \alpha) - v(c))) < \beta(u(c + \gamma) - u(c)) - (u(c + \alpha) - u(c)). \quad (12)$$

If φ is strictly convex with $\varphi(0) = 0$, $p\varphi(v(c + \alpha) - v(c)) > \varphi(p(v(c + \alpha) - v(c)))$. Thus the LHS of (11) is strictly greater than that of (12), and hence there exist c, α and γ consistent with both (11) and (12).

3 Foundations

3.1 Axioms

From now on, we use the following notation: For all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ and $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$, let $\lambda l' \equiv \lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'$.

Say that \succsim on \mathcal{D} is a *self-control preference* if there exist $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$ with $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$.

The axioms which we consider on \succsim are the following. The first two axioms are standard and need no explanation.

Axiom 1 (Order). \succsim is complete and transitive.

Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all $x \in \mathcal{Z}$, $\{z \in \mathcal{Z} | x \succsim z\}$ and $\{z \in \mathcal{Z} | z \succsim x\}$ are closed.

The next is a key axiom of GP. It captures behavior of the DM who cares about the most tempting item within the menu at hand.

Axiom 3 (Set Betweenness). For all x, y , if $x \succsim y$, then $x \succsim x \cup y \succsim y$.

GP show that \succsim satisfies Order, Continuity, Set Betweenness and Independence mentioned as (5) if and only if it admits a representation of the form (1).

Let $\mathcal{M}(C)$ be the set of all signed measures on $\Delta(C)$ and

$$\Theta \equiv \{\theta \in \mathcal{M}(C) \mid \theta(\Delta(C)) = 0\}$$

be the set of all translations. For all $l \in \Delta(C)$ and $\theta \in \Theta$, if $l + \theta \in \Delta(C)$, we can view $l + \theta$ as the lottery obtained by shifting l toward θ . For all $l \in \Delta(C)$, say that $\theta \in \Theta$ is admissible for l if $l + \theta \in \Delta(C)$.

The next axiom is a variant of Strong Continuity of Ergin and Sarver [4].

Axiom 4 (Properness). There exists $\theta \in \Theta$ such that for all $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$ with $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$, $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, if $d(l\lambda l', l') < \varepsilon$ and $l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta \in \Delta(C)$, then

$$\{l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\}.$$

The ranking $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ reveals that the DM is tempted by l' . Since $l\lambda l'$ would be preferred to l' and less tempting than l' , the DM should rank $\{l, l\lambda l'\}$ over $\{l, l'\}$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. Properness says that, for a sufficiently small λ , the difference between $\{l, l\lambda l'\}$ and $\{l, l'\}$ would be negligible, and hence the ranking can be reversed when $\{l, l'\}$ is slightly translated toward the normatively preferable direction θ .

Suppose that the DM has two rankings of lotteries in mind; one is the commitment ranking that reflects her normative view, and the other is the temptation ranking expressing her craving. If the DM knows that both rankings conform with the expected utility axioms, she should not care about shifting a menu x toward θ because such a translation does not alter the difference between temptation utility of the most tempting lottery and that of a lottery she will choose. Thus we introduce the following axiom:

Axiom 5 (Translation Invariance). For all $l, l', k, k' \in \Delta(C)$ and $\theta \in \Theta$, if θ is admissible for these lotteries, then

$$\{l, l'\} \succsim \{k, k'\} \Rightarrow \{l + \theta, l' + \theta\} \succsim \{k + \theta, k' + \theta\}.$$

Following Noor [12], for all $l \in \Delta(C)$, let

$$\begin{aligned} L_+(l) &\equiv \{l' \in \Delta(C) \mid \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}\}, \\ L_-(l) &\equiv \{l' \in \Delta(C) \mid \{l\} \sim \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}\}. \end{aligned}$$

Axiom 6 (Temptation Convexity). For all $l \in \Delta(C)$, (i) $L_+(l)$ and $L_-(l)$ are convex, and, (ii) for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$,

$$\begin{aligned} \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} &\Rightarrow \{l\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\}, \\ \{l\} \sim \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\} &\Rightarrow \{l\} \sim \{l, l\lambda l'\} \succ \{l\lambda l'\}. \end{aligned}$$

Part (i) says that, if both l' and l'' tempt l , then $l'\lambda l''$ also tempts l . Moreover, if neither l' nor l'' tempts l , then $l'\lambda l''$ does not tempt l either. Part (ii) says that, if l' tempts l , then $l\lambda l'$ also tempts l , and if l' does not tempt l , then neither does $l\lambda l'$.

Translation Invariance implies that, for all l, l' and admissible θ ,

$$\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \Rightarrow \{l + \theta\} \succ \{l + \theta, l' + \theta\}. \quad (13)$$

Noor [12] shows that, under axiom (13) and Temptation Convexity, there exists a preference relation \succ_T over $\Delta(C)$ satisfying the vNM axioms and, if $\{l\} \succ \{l'\}$ then

$$l' \succ_T l \Leftrightarrow \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}.$$

We can interpret \succ_T as a temptation ranking of the DM. Indifference relation \sim_T is defined as a usual manner.

Axiom 7 (Temptation Consistency). For all $l, l', l'' \in \Delta(C)$, if $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l''\}$ and $l' \sim_T l''$, then $\{l, l''\} \succsim \{l, l'\}$.

As stated above, suppose that the DM exhibits self-control at $\{l, l'\}$ and that l' and l'' are equally tempting. If the DM chooses l over l'' at $\{l, l''\}$, she would incur the same self-control cost as choosing l out of $\{l, l'\}$ because l' and l'' are equally tempting. Thus the ex post choice from $\{l, l''\}$ guarantees at least the same utility as that from $\{l, l'\}$, and hence $\{l, l''\}$ should be at least as good as $\{l, l'\}$.

For any $x \in \mathcal{D}$, if there exists a lottery $e(x) \in \Delta(C)$ satisfying $\{e(x)\} \sim x$, $e(x)$ is called a singleton equivalent of x .

Axiom 8 (Mixing Preserves Self-Control). For all $l, l', l'' \in \Delta(C)$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$,

- (i) if $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$, then $\{l\lambda l''\} \succ \{l\lambda l'', l'\lambda l''\} \succ \{l'\lambda l''\}$, and
- (ii) if $\{l, l'\}$ and $\{l, l''\}$ admit singleton equivalents, and if $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l''\} \succ \{l''\}$, then $\{l, l'\lambda l''\} \succsim \{e(\{l, l'\})\lambda e(\{l, l''\})\}$.

Part (i) says that, if the DM exhibits self-control at $\{l, l'\}$, then she does so at $\{l\lambda l'', l'\lambda l''\}$ because mixing of items may mitigate a self-control cost. As in part (ii), suppose that the DM exhibits self-control at both $\{l, l'\}$ and $\{l, l''\}$. Since a self-control cost at $\{l, l'\lambda l''\}$ will be less than the highest self-control cost between at $\{l, l'\}$ and $\{l, l''\}$, she should exhibit self-control at $\{l, l'\lambda l''\}$. Part (ii) says that a self-control cost from choosing l out of $\{l, l'\lambda l''\}$ is smaller than the average self-control cost between from choosing l out of $\{l, l'\}$ and that of $\{l, l''\}$. The role of part (ii) is to establish convexity of φ .

Suppose that l' and k' tempt l and k , respectively, and that the DM exhibits self-control at $\{l, l'\}$. Suppose that lotteries l, l', k, k' and another lottery h are mixed with the same weight λ , and translated so as to satisfy $l\lambda h + \theta = k\lambda h + \theta'$. If \succsim satisfies MPSC and Translation Invariance, she exhibits self-control also at $\{l\lambda h + \theta, l'\lambda h + \theta\}$. Since $l\lambda h + \theta = k\lambda h + \theta'$, the ranking, $\{k\lambda h + \theta', k'\lambda h + \theta'\} \succsim \{l\lambda h + \theta, l'\lambda h + \theta\}$, implies that

the self-control cost from choosing $l\lambda h + \theta$ out of $\{l\lambda h + \theta, l'\lambda h + \theta\}$ exceeds the cost of choice at $\{k\lambda h + \theta', k'\lambda h + \theta'\}$. This ranking should be preserved when $\{l, l'\}$ and $\{k, k'\}$ are translated so as to satisfy $l + \tilde{\theta} = k + \tilde{\theta}'$. That is, the ranking $\{k + \tilde{\theta}', k' + \tilde{\theta}'\} \succeq \{l + \tilde{\theta}, l' + \tilde{\theta}\}$ would still hold. This axiom has an appeal when the DM expects her temptation ranking to conform with the expected utility axioms.

Prior to formulating the above idea, notice that, for some $\{l, l'\}$ and $\{k, k'\}$, there exist no admissible translations at all satisfying $l + \tilde{\theta} = k + \tilde{\theta}'$. Thus, alternatively, consider singleton equivalents of $\{l, l'\}$ and of $\{k, k'\}$ as follows:

Axiom 9 (Monotone Self-Control). For all $l, l', k, k', h \in \Delta(C)$ such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $\{k\} \succ \{k, k'\}$, if there exist $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ and admissible translations $\theta, \theta' \in \Theta$ with $l\lambda h + \theta = k\lambda h + \theta'$ such that

$$\{k\lambda h + \theta', k'\lambda h + \theta'\} \succeq \{l\lambda h + \theta, l'\lambda h + \theta\},$$

then $\{e(\{k, k'\}) + \tilde{\theta}'\} \succeq \{e(\{l, l'\}) + \tilde{\theta}\}$ for all admissible translations $\tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\theta}'$ satisfying $e(\{l\}) + \tilde{\theta} = e(\{k\}) + \tilde{\theta}'$.

3.2 Results

We are ready to state the main theorem.

Theorem 3.1.

- (i) *If a self-control preference \succeq satisfies Order, Continuity, Set Betweenness, Translation Invariance, Temptation Convexity, Temptation Consistency, MPSC and Monotone Self-Control, then \succeq admits a partial convex self-control representation.*
- (ii) *Suppose that C is finite. A self-control preference \succeq satisfies Order, Continuity, Set Betweenness, Translation Invariance, Temptation Convexity, Temptation Consistency, MPSC, Monotone Self-Control and Properness if and only if \succeq admits a convex self-control representation.*

Theorem 3.1 (i) says that there exists a partial convex self-control representation if \succeq satisfies all the axioms except for Properness. The necessary part does not hold in general because φ may not be convex on the whole domain, which may violate MPSC and Monotone Self-Control. The reason why we cannot ensure convexity of φ is that the axioms are not enough to establish Lipschitz continuity of φ . As stated in Theorem 3.1 (ii), if we impose Properness in addition and assume that C is finite, then the set of axioms characterizes the convex self-control model.

We turn to uniqueness of convex self-control representations. For a convex self-control representation (u, v, φ) , define

$$W(u, v, \varphi) = \{w \in \mathbb{R}_+ | w = v(l') - v(l) \text{ for some } l, l' \text{ with } \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}\}.$$

We call $W(u, v, \varphi)$ the self-control region for (u, v, φ) .

Theorem 3.2. *Suppose that a self-control preference \succsim admits a convex self-control representation U with components (u, v, φ) .*

- (i) *If $u' = \alpha_u u + \beta_u$ and $v' = \alpha_v v + \beta_v$ for some $\alpha_u, \alpha_v > 0$, $\beta_u, \beta_v \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\varphi'(\alpha_v w) = \alpha_u \varphi(w)$ for $w \in \mathbb{R}_+$, then the functional form with components (u', v', φ') also represents \succsim . Conversely, if another representation U' with components (u', v', φ') also represents \succsim , then there exist $\alpha_u, \alpha_v > 0$ and $\beta_u, \beta_v \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $u' = \alpha_u u + \beta_u$, $v' = \alpha_v v + \beta_v$, $W(u', v', \varphi') = \alpha_v W(u, v, \varphi)$, and $\varphi'(\alpha_v w) = \alpha_u \varphi(w)$ for all $w \in W(u, v, \varphi)$.*
- (ii) *Take any continuous and strictly increasing function $\varphi' : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ such that $\varphi' = \varphi$ on the closure of $W(u, v, \varphi)$ and $\varphi' \geq \varphi$ elsewhere. Then the functional form with components (u, v, φ') coincides with U .*

From Part (i), we know that u and v are unique up to positive affine transformation. Moreover, if (u, v, φ) and $(\tilde{u}, \tilde{v}, \tilde{\varphi})$ represent the same preference and $\tilde{v} = \alpha_v v + \beta_v$, then for $\tilde{w} = \alpha_v w$ and $w \in W(u, v, \varphi)$,

$$\frac{\tilde{w}\tilde{\varphi}''(\tilde{w})}{\tilde{\varphi}'(\tilde{w})} = \frac{w\varphi''(w)}{\varphi'(w)}$$

where f' and f'' denote the first and the second derivatives of f , respectively. Thus the curvature of φ is uniquely determined within the self-control region, while part (ii) says that φ is not unique beyond the self-control region.

4 Proofs

4.1 Sufficiency Part of Theorem 3.1

Throughout the proof, we assume that \succsim satisfies all the axioms except for Properness and C is a compact metric space unless otherwise stated.

Lemma 6 of Ergin and Sarver [4] show that Order, Continuity, and Translation Invariance imply Commitment Independence: For all $l, l', l'' \in \Delta(C)$,

$$\{l\} \succsim \{l'\} \Leftrightarrow \lambda\{l\} + (1 - \lambda)\{l''\} \succsim \lambda\{l'\} + (1 - \lambda)\{l''\}.$$

Since \succsim satisfies all the vNM axioms on $\Delta(C)$, there exists a continuous mixture linear function $u : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ which represents \succsim on $\Delta(C)$.

Since u is continuous on $\Delta(C)$, there exist a maximal and a minimal lotteries $c^+, c^- \in \Delta(C)$. Without loss of generality, we can assume $u(c^+) = 1$ and $u(c^-) = 0$. For any finite menu x , Set Betweenness implies that $\{c^+\} \succsim x \succsim \{c^-\}$. Continuity ensures that $\{c^+\} \succsim x \succsim \{c^-\}$ for all $x \in \mathcal{D}$. By Continuity, there exists a unique number $\alpha(x) \in [0, 1]$ such that $x \sim \{\alpha(x)c^+ + (1 - \alpha(x))c^-\}$. That is, all menus admit singleton equivalents. Define

$$U(x) = u(\alpha(x)c^+ + (1 - \alpha(x))c^-).$$

Then U represents \succsim . Moreover, $U(\{l\}) = u(l)$ for all $l \in \Delta(C)$. This representation has the following properties:

Lemma 4.1.

- (i) For all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ and all $l, l', l'' \in \Delta(C)$ such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l''\} \succ \{l''\}$, $U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}) \geq \lambda U(\{l, l'\}) + (1 - \lambda)U(\{l, l''\})$.
- (ii) For all $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$ and $\theta \in \Theta$, if $l + \theta, l' + \theta \in \Delta(C)$, then $U(\{l + \theta, l' + \theta\}) = U(\{l, l'\}) + u(\theta)$.

Proof. (i) By definition of singleton equivalent, $U(\{l, l'\}) = u(e(\{l, l'\}))$ and $U(\{l, l''\}) = u(e(\{l, l''\}))$. By MPSC (i) and mixture linearity of u ,

$$\begin{aligned} U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}) &\geq u(\lambda e(\{l, l'\}) + (1 - \lambda)e(\{l, l''\})) = \lambda u(e(\{l, l'\})) + (1 - \lambda)u(e(\{l, l''\})) \\ &= \lambda U(\{l, l'\}) + (1 - \lambda)U(\{l, l''\}). \end{aligned}$$

(ii) By Set Betweenness, $\{l\} \succsim \{l, l'\} \succsim \{l'\}$. Since u is continuous, there exists $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ such that $U(\{l, l'\}) = u(l\lambda l')$. If $l + \theta, l' + \theta \in \Delta(C)$, $l\lambda l' + \theta = (l + \theta)\lambda(l' + \theta) \in \Delta(C)$. Hence Translation Invariance implies that

$$U(\{l + \theta, l' + \theta\}) = u(l\lambda l' + \theta) = u(l\lambda l') + u(\theta) = U(\{l, l'\}) + u(\theta).$$

□

Lemma 7 of Noor [12] shows that, under Translation Invariance and Temptation Convexity, there exists a continuous mixture linear function $v : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ such that, if $\{l\} \succ \{l'\}$, then

$$\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \Leftrightarrow v(l') > v(l).$$

Without loss of generality, assume that $v(\Delta(C)) = [0, 1]$. By his construction, we know that $L_+(l) \subset \{l' \in \Delta(C) | v(l') > v(l)\}$ and $L_-(l) \subset \{l' \in \Delta(C) | v(l') \leq v(l)\}$.

Let

$$A = \{w \in [0, 1] | w = v(l') - v(l), \text{ for some } l, l' \text{ such that } \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}\}.$$

Since \succsim is a self-control preference, A is non-empty.

Lemma 4.2. (i) A is an interval with $\inf A = 0$. (ii) A is open in $[0, 1]$.

Proof. (i) It suffices to show that, for all $w \in A$, $\lambda w \in A$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. Let $w \in A$. There exist l, l' such that $w = v(l') - v(l)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$. By MPSC (i), $\{l\} \succ \{l, (1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l'\} \succ \{(1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l'\}$. Thus $\lambda w = \lambda(v(l') - v(l)) = v((1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l') - v(l) \in A$.

(ii) Notice first that $0 \notin A$ by definition of v . If there exist l, l' such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $v(l') - v(l) = 1$, we can conclude from (i) that $A = (0, 1]$, and hence A is relatively open in $[0, 1]$. Now suppose that $A = (0, \bar{w}]$ for some $\bar{w} < 1$. Then there exist

l, l' such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $v(l') - v(l) = \bar{w}$. We have either $\max_{\Delta(C)} v > v(l')$ or $\min_{\Delta(C)} v < v(l)$. In case of the former, Continuity implies that there exists l'' sufficiently close to l' such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l''\} \succ \{l''\}$ and $v(l'') > v(l')$. Thus $\bar{w} < v(l'') - v(l) \in A$, which is a contradiction. In case of the latter, there exists l'' sufficiently close to l such that $\{l''\} \succ \{l'', l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $v(l) > v(l'')$. Thus $\bar{w} < v(l') - v(l'') \in A$, which is a contradiction either. Therefore A must be an open interval in $[0, 1]$. \square

Define $\varphi : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}$ by

$$\varphi(w) \equiv u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}),$$

where l, l' satisfy $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $w = v(l') - v(l)$.

Lemma 4.3. φ is well-defined, that is, for any $l, l', k, k' \in \Delta(C)$ such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $\{k\} \succ \{k, k'\} \succ \{k'\}$,

$$v(k') - v(k) = v(l') - v(l) \Rightarrow u(k) - U(\{k, k'\}) = u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}).$$

Proof. Assume that $v(k') - v(k) = v(l') - v(l)$. Take a full support lottery $h \in \Delta(C)$. By MPSC (i), for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$,

$$\{\lambda h\} \succ \{\lambda h, l'\lambda h\} \succ \{l'\lambda h\}, \{k\lambda h\} \succ \{k\lambda h, k'\lambda h\} \succ \{k'\lambda h\}.$$

Let $\theta \equiv l\lambda h - k\lambda h \in \Theta$. For small λ , $k'\lambda h + \theta \in \Delta(C)$. Since v is mixture linear,

$$\begin{aligned} v(k'\lambda h + \theta) - v(l\lambda h) &= v(k'\lambda h + \theta) - v(k\lambda h + \theta) = \lambda(v(k') - v(k)) \\ &= \lambda(v(l') - v(l)) = v(l'\lambda h) - v(l\lambda h). \end{aligned}$$

Thus $v(k'\lambda h + \theta) = v(l'\lambda h)$. Furthermore, by Translation Invariance, $\{k\lambda h + \theta\} \succ \{k\lambda h + \theta, k'\lambda h + \theta\} \succ \{k'\lambda h + \theta\}$, that is, $\{l\lambda h\} \succ \{l\lambda h, k'\lambda h + \theta\} \succ \{k'\lambda h + \theta\}$. By Temptation Consistency, $\{l\lambda h, l'\lambda h\} \sim \{l\lambda h, k'\lambda h + \theta\}$. Let $e(\{l\}) = \alpha(\{l\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{l\}))c^-$, $e(\{k\}) = \alpha(\{k\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{k\}))c^-$, $e(\{l, l'\}) = \alpha(\{l, l'\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{l, l'\}))c^-$ and $e(\{k, k'\}) = \alpha(\{k, k'\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{k, k'\}))c^-$. By definition, $u(l) = u(e(\{l\}))$, $u(k) = u(e(\{k\}))$, $U(\{l, l'\}) = u(e(\{l, l'\}))$, and $U(\{k, k'\}) = u(e(\{k, k'\}))$. Since these lotteries belong to

$$\{\alpha c^+ + (1 - \alpha)c^- \in \Delta(C) \mid \alpha \in [0, 1]\},$$

we can find $\theta_l, \theta_k \in \Theta$ such that $e(\{l\}) + \theta_l = e(\{k\}) + \theta_k$ and $e(\{l\}) + \theta_l, e(\{k\}) + \theta_k, e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l, e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k \in \Delta(C)$. By Monotone Self-Control, $\{e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l\} \succeq \{e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k\}$, and hence

$$\begin{aligned} u(e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l) &\geq u(e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k) \\ \Leftrightarrow u(k + \theta_k) - u(e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k) &\geq u(l + \theta_l) - u(e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l) \\ \Leftrightarrow u(k) - u(e(\{k, k'\})) &\geq u(l) - u(e(\{l, l'\})) \\ \Leftrightarrow u(k) - U(\{k, k'\}) &\geq u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}). \end{aligned}$$

By the symmetric argument, we can show $u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}) \geq u(k) - U(\{k, k'\})$ as well. \square

Lemma 4.4. (i) φ is weakly convex, and (ii) $\liminf_{w \rightarrow 0} \varphi(w) = 0$.

Proof. (i) Take any $w, w' \in A$ with $w > w'$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. There exist $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$ such that $w = v(l') - v(l)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$. Since $w > w' > 0$, there exists $\mu \in (0, 1)$ satisfying $v(l\mu l') - v(l) = w'$. Define $l'' \equiv l\mu l'$. By MPSC (i), $\{l\} \succ \{l, l''\} \succ \{l''\}$. By definition,

$$\varphi(w) = u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}), \quad \varphi(w') = u(l) - U(\{l, l''\}). \quad (14)$$

By mixture linearity of v ,

$$\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w' = \lambda(v(l') - v(l)) + (1 - \lambda)(v(l'') - v(l)) = v(l'\lambda l'') - v(l).$$

Since $v(l'\lambda l'') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l'\lambda l'')$, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\lambda l''\}$. Furthermore, by MPSC (ii),

$$\begin{aligned} U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}) &\geq u(\lambda e(\{l, l'\}) + (1 - \lambda)e(\{l, l''\})) = \lambda u(e(\{l, l'\})) + (1 - \lambda)u(e\{l, l''\}) \\ &> \lambda u(l') + (1 - \lambda)u(l'') = u(l'\lambda l''). \end{aligned}$$

Thus by definition of φ ,

$$\varphi(\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w') = \varphi(v(l'\lambda l'') - v(l)) = u(l) - U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}). \quad (15)$$

Taking (14), (15) and Lemma 4.1 together,

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda\varphi(w) + (1 - \lambda)\varphi(w') &= \lambda u(l) + (1 - \lambda)u(l) - \lambda U(\{l, l'\}) - (1 - \lambda)U(\{l, l''\}) \\ &\geq u(l) - U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}) = \varphi(\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w'). \end{aligned}$$

(ii) Take any $w \in A$. There exist l, l' such that $w = v(l') - v(l)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$. By MPSC (i), $\{l\} \succ \{l, (1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l'\} \succ \{(1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l'\}$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. Since

$$\varphi(\lambda w) = \varphi(v((1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l') - v(l)) = u(l) - U(\{l, (1 - \lambda)l + \lambda l'\}),$$

$$0 = \liminf_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \varphi(\lambda w) \geq \liminf_{w \rightarrow 0} \varphi(w) \geq 0, \text{ and hence } \liminf_{w \rightarrow 0} \varphi(w) = 0. \quad \square$$

Denote the closure of A by \bar{A} . By Lemma 4.2 (i), \bar{A} is a closed interval including 0.

Lemma 4.5. *There exists a unique continuous convex extension of φ to \bar{A} . Moreover, the extension $\bar{\varphi}$ is strictly increasing with $\bar{\varphi}(0) = 0$.*

Proof. Theorem 10.3 [14, p.85] ensures the existence of a unique continuous convex extension $\bar{\varphi}$. By Lemma 4.4 (ii),

$$0 = \liminf_{w \rightarrow 0} \varphi(w) = \liminf_{w \rightarrow 0} \bar{\varphi}(w) = \lim_{w \rightarrow 0} \bar{\varphi}(w) = \bar{\varphi}(0).$$

Finally, we claim that $\bar{\varphi}$ is strictly increasing, that is, $w' > w$ implies $\bar{\varphi}(w') > \bar{\varphi}(w)$. Since $\bar{\varphi}(w') > 0 = \bar{\varphi}(0)$ for all $w' \in A$, the claim holds when $w = 0$ and $w' \in A$. Suppose that

there exist $w, w' \in A$ such that $w' > w$ and $\overline{\varphi}(w') \leq \overline{\varphi}(w)$. There exists $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ with $w = \lambda w'$. Since $\overline{\varphi}$ is weakly convex,

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{\varphi}(w) &= \overline{\varphi}(\lambda w') = \overline{\varphi}(\lambda w' + (1 - \lambda)0) \leq \lambda \overline{\varphi}(w') + (1 - \lambda)\overline{\varphi}(0) \\ &= \lambda \overline{\varphi}(w') \leq \lambda \overline{\varphi}(w) < \overline{\varphi}(w),\end{aligned}$$

which is a contradiction. Thus $\overline{\varphi}$ is strictly increasing on $A \cup \{0\}$. Let $\overline{w} \equiv \sup A$. Since $\varphi(w) < \sup\{\varphi(w) | w \in A\} = \overline{\varphi}(\overline{w})$ for all $w \in A \cup \{0\}$, $\overline{\varphi}$ is strictly increasing on \overline{A} . \square

Lemma 4.6. *Assume in addition that C is finite and \succsim satisfies Properness.*

- (i) *There exists $K > 0$ such that, for all $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$ with $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) \leq Kd(l\lambda l', l')$.*
- (ii) *There exists $\overline{K} > 0$ such that, for all $w, w' \in \overline{A}$ with $w' > w$,*

$$\frac{\varphi(w') - \varphi(w)}{w' - w} \leq \overline{K}.$$

Proof. (i) Since $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$, we have $v(l') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l')$, and hence $\{l\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\}$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. If $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$, MPSC (i) implies $\{l\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\} \succ \{l\lambda l'\}$. Since $v(l') - v(l) > v(l\lambda l') - v(l)$ and $\overline{\varphi}$ is strictly increasing,

$$u(l) - U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) = \overline{\varphi}(v(l\lambda l') - v(l)) < \overline{\varphi}(v(l') - v(l)) = u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}),$$

that is, $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) > U(\{l, l'\})$. If $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \sim \{l'\}$, by Set Betweenness,

$$\{l, l\lambda l'\} \succsim \{l\lambda l'\} \succ \{l'\} \sim \{l, l'\}.$$

In either case, we have $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) > U(\{l, l'\})$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$.

We adapt the argument in Ergin and Sarver [4, Lemma 16]. Since C is finite, the metric $d(a, b)$ on $\Delta(C)$ is understood to be the metric induced by a norm in $\mathbb{R}^{\#C}$. That is, $d(a, b) = \|a - b\|$. Let $\theta \in \Theta$ be the object guaranteed by Properness. Let $K \equiv u(\theta)$.

Step 1: For all $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, if $l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta \in \Delta(C)$ and $d(l\lambda l', l') < \varepsilon$, then $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) \leq Kd(l\lambda l', l')$.

Take any $\varepsilon' > 0$ with $d(l\lambda l', l') < \varepsilon' < \varepsilon$. Then $l + \varepsilon'\theta, l' + \varepsilon'\theta \in \Delta(C)$. By Properness and Lemma 4.1 (ii),

$$U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) < U(\{l + \varepsilon'\theta, l' + \varepsilon'\theta\}) = U(\{l, l'\}) + \varepsilon'u(\theta) = U(\{l, l'\}) + K\varepsilon'.$$

Hence $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) < K\varepsilon'$. Since this inequality holds for all ε' with $d(l\lambda l', l') < \varepsilon' < \varepsilon$, $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) \leq Kd(l\lambda l', l')$.

Since $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) > U(\{l, l'\})$, K is positive.

Step 2: For all $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, if $l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta \in \Delta(C)$, then $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) \leq Kd(l\lambda l', l')$.

For all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, let $l(\alpha) = \alpha(l\lambda l') + (1 - \alpha)l'$. Notice that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l(\alpha)\}$. Since $l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta \in \Delta(C)$,

$$l(\alpha) + \varepsilon\theta = \alpha(l\lambda l') + (1 - \alpha)l' + \theta = \alpha\lambda(l + \varepsilon\theta) + (1 - \alpha\lambda)(l' + \varepsilon\theta) \in \Delta(C).$$

By continuity of $l(\alpha)$, for all α , we can find an open interval $O(\alpha) \subset [0, 1]$ such that $\alpha \in O(\alpha)$ and $d(l(\alpha), l(\alpha')) < \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ for all $\alpha' \in O(\alpha)$. Then $\{O(\alpha) | \alpha \in [0, 1]\}$ is an open cover of $[0, 1]$. Since $[0, 1]$ is compact, there exists a finite open cover $\{O(\alpha_1), \dots, O(\alpha_k)\}$. Without loss of generality, assume $\alpha_1 \leq \dots \leq \alpha_k$. Let $\alpha_0 \equiv 0$ and $\alpha_{k+1} \equiv 1$. Since $\{l\} \succ \{l, l(\alpha_i)\}$, $l(\alpha_i) + \varepsilon\theta \in \Delta(C)$ and $d(l(\alpha_{i+1}), l(\alpha_i)) < \varepsilon$, Step 1 implies

$$U(\{l, l(\alpha_{i+1})\}) - U(\{l, l(\alpha_i)\}) \leq Kd(l(\alpha_{i+1}), l(\alpha_i)).$$

Since $d(l(\alpha_{i+1}), l(\alpha_i)) = \|l(\alpha_{i+1}) - l(\alpha_i)\| = (\alpha_{i+1} - \alpha_i)\|l\lambda l' - l'\|$ and $l(\alpha_0) = l'$ and $l(\alpha_{k+1}) = l\lambda l'$,

$$\begin{aligned} U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) &= \sum_{i=0}^k (U(\{l, l(\alpha_{i+1})\}) - U(\{l, l(\alpha_i)\})) \leq K \sum_{i=0}^k d(l(\alpha_{i+1}), l(\alpha_i)) \\ &= Kd(l\lambda l', l') \sum_{i=0}^k (\alpha_{i+1} - \alpha_i) = Kd(l\lambda l', l'). \end{aligned}$$

Step 3: For all l, l' with $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) \leq Kd(l\lambda l', l')$.

Take a lottery l^* in the relative interior of $\Delta(C)$. There exists $\kappa > 0$ such that $l^* + \kappa\theta \in \Delta(C)$. Let $l^n = (1 - \frac{1}{n})l + \frac{1}{n}l^*$, $l'^n = (1 - \frac{1}{n})l' + \frac{1}{n}l^*$ and $\varepsilon^n = \frac{\kappa}{n}$. Since $v(l') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l')$, we have $v(l'^n) > v(l^n)$ and $u(l^n) > u(l'^n)$, and hence $\{l^n\} \succ \{l'^n, l'^n\}$. Furthermore, $l^n + \varepsilon^n\theta, l'^n + \varepsilon^n\theta \in \Delta(C)$. Thus Step 2 implies, for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$,

$$U(\{l^n, l^n\lambda l'^n\}) - U(\{l^n, l'^n\}) \leq Kd(l^n\lambda l'^n, l'^n).$$

Since U is continuous, we have $U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) - U(\{l, l'\}) \leq Kd(l\lambda l', l')$.

(ii) Take a monotone sequence $w^n \rightarrow \bar{w}$ with $w^n \in A$. There exist a^n, b^n such that $w^n = v(b^n) - v(a^n)$ and $\{a^n\} \succ \{a^n, b^n\} \succ \{b^n\}$. Since $\{a^n\}_{n=0}^\infty$ and $\{b^n\}_{n=0}^\infty$ are sequences in $\Delta(C)$, assume $a^n \rightarrow a^0$ and $b^n \rightarrow b^0$ without loss of generality. For all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, $\{a^n\} \succ \{a^n, a^n\lambda b^n\} \succ \{a^n\lambda b^n\}$ and $v(a^n\lambda b^n) - v(a^n) = (1 - \lambda)(v(b^n) - v(a^n)) = (1 - \lambda)w^n$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varphi(\bar{w}) - \varphi((1 - \lambda)\bar{w})}{\lambda\bar{w}} &= \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\varphi(w^n) - \varphi((1 - \lambda)w^n)}{\lambda w^n} \\ &= \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{U(\{a^n, a^n\lambda b^n\}) - U(\{a^n, b^n\})}{\lambda w^n} \\ &= \frac{U(\{a^0, a^0\lambda b^0\}) - U(\{a^0, b^0\})}{\lambda\bar{w}}. \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

Since the LHS of (16) is positive, $U(\{a^0, a^0\lambda b^0\}) > U(\{a^0, b^0\})$. Since $v(b^0) - v(a^0) = \bar{w} > 0$, $v(b^0) > v(a^0)$. By continuity of u , $u(a^0) \geq u(b^0)$. If $u(a^0) = u(b^0)$, Set Betweenness implies $U(\{a^0, a^0\lambda b^0\}) = U(\{a^0, b^0\})$. Thus we must have $u(a^0) > u(b^0)$. By definition of v , $\{a^0\} \succ \{a^0, b^0\}$. Let $K > 0$ be the number guaranteed by (i). For all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$,

$$U(\{a^0, a^0\lambda b^0\}) - U(\{a^0, b^0\}) \leq Kd(a^0\lambda b^0, b^0) = K\|b^0 - a^0\lambda b^0\| = \lambda K\|b^0 - a^0\|. \quad (17)$$

Taking (16) and (17) together, $\bar{K} \equiv K\|b^0 - a^0\|/\bar{w}$ satisfies

$$\sup_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \frac{\varphi(\bar{w}) - \varphi((1 - \lambda)\bar{w})}{\lambda\bar{w}} \leq \bar{K}. \quad (18)$$

Since φ is strictly increasing and convex, (18) implies the desired property. \square

Lemma 4.7. *There exists a strictly increasing continuous extension of $\bar{\varphi}$ to \mathbb{R}_+ such that, for all $a, b \in \Delta(C)$,*

$$U(\{a, b\}) = \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) - \bar{\varphi} \left(\max_{\{a, b\}} v - v(l) \right) \right).$$

Furthermore, if C is finite and \succsim satisfies Properness, then the extension $\bar{\varphi}$ can be taken to be convex.

Proof. By Lemma 4.5, there exists a strictly increasing continuous extension of $\bar{\varphi}$ to \mathbb{R}_+ . Without loss of generality, assume $\{a\} \succsim \{b\}$. By Set Betweenness, $\{a\} \succsim \{a, b\} \succsim \{b\}$. There are four cases: (i) $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$; (ii) $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$; (iii) $\{a\} \sim \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$; and (iv) $\{a\} \sim \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$. We first show that, in cases of (i), (iii) and (iv), the desired result holds for any increasing extension $\bar{\varphi}$.

(i) $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$. In this case, $v(b) > v(a)$. By definition of φ , $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) - \varphi(v(b) - v(a)) > u(b)$. Thus $U(\{a, b\})$ can be expressed as the desired form.

(iii) $\{a\} \sim \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$. By definition, $b \in L_-(a)$. By construction of v , $v(a) \geq v(b)$. Since $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) > u(b) - \bar{\varphi}(v(a) - v(b))$, $U(\{a, b\})$ is represented by the desired form.

(iv) $\{a\} \sim \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$. If $v(b) \geq v(a)$, $U(\{a, b\}) = u(b) \geq u(a) - \bar{\varphi}(v(b) - v(a))$. If $v(a) \geq v(b)$, we have $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) \geq u(b) - \bar{\varphi}(v(a) - v(b))$. In either case, $U(\{a, b\})$ is represented by the desired form.

Now turn to case (ii) $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$. This ranking implies $v(b) > v(a)$.

Step 1: If $v(b) - v(a) \in A$, then $u(b) \geq u(a) - \varphi(v(b) - v(a))$.

There exists a', b' such that $\{a'\} \succ \{a', b'\} \succ \{b'\}$ and $v(b') - v(a') = v(b) - v(a)$. Since $\varphi(v(b) - v(a)) = \varphi(v(b') - v(a')) = u(a') - U(\{a', b'\})$, it suffices to show that $u(a') - U(\{a', b'\}) \geq u(a) - U(\{a, b\})$. Take a full support lottery $h \in \Delta(C)$. For all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, since $v(b\lambda h) > v(a\lambda h)$ and $u(a\lambda h) > u(b\lambda h)$, $\{a\lambda h\} \succ \{a\lambda h, b\lambda h\}$. By MPSC (i), $\{a'\lambda h\} \succ \{a'\lambda h, b'\lambda h\} \succ \{b'\lambda h\}$. Let $\bar{\theta} \equiv a'\lambda h - a\lambda h \in \Theta$. For sufficiently small λ , $b\lambda h + \bar{\theta} \in \Delta(C)$. By Translation Invariance,

$$\{a'\lambda h\} = \{a\lambda h + \bar{\theta}\} \succ \{a\lambda h + \bar{\theta}, b\lambda h + \bar{\theta}\} = \{a'\lambda h, b\lambda h + \bar{\theta}\}.$$

Moreover, since

$$v(b\lambda h + \bar{\theta}) - v(a'\lambda h) = \lambda(v(b) - v(a)) = \lambda(v(b') - v(a')) = v(b'\lambda h) - v(a'\lambda h),$$

$v(b\lambda h + \bar{\theta}) = v(b'\lambda h)$. By Temptation Consistency, $\{a'\lambda h, b\lambda h + \bar{\theta}\} \succsim \{a'\lambda h, b'\lambda h\}$. Let $e(\{a\}) = \alpha(\{a\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{a\}))c^-$, $e(\{a'\}) = \alpha(\{a'\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{a'\}))c^-$, $e(\{a, b\}) = \alpha(\{a, b\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{a, b\}))c^-$ and $e(\{a', b'\}) = \alpha(\{a', b'\})c^+ + (1 - \alpha(\{a', b'\}))c^-$. By definition, $u(a) = u(e(\{a\}))$, $u(a') = u(e(\{a'\}))$, $U(\{a, b\}) = u(e(\{a, b\}))$, and $U(\{a', b'\}) = u(e(\{a', b'\}))$. There exist feasible $\theta, \theta' \in \Theta$ such that $e(\{a\}) + \theta = e(\{a'\}) + \theta'$. By Monotone Self-Control, $\{e(\{a, b\}) + \theta\} \succsim \{e(\{a', b'\}) + \theta'\}$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} & u(a' + \theta') - u(e(\{a', b'\}) + \theta') \geq u(a + \theta) - u(e(\{a, b\}) + \theta) \\ \Leftrightarrow & u(a') - u(e(\{a', b'\})) \geq u(a) - u(e(\{a, b\})) \\ \Leftrightarrow & u(a') - U(\{a', b'\}) \geq u(a) - U(\{a, b\}). \end{aligned}$$

By Step 1, when $A = (0, 1]$, we complete the proof. Now consider the case that $A = (0, \bar{w})$ for some $\bar{w} \leq 1$. Let

$$B = \{w \in [\bar{w}, 1] \mid w = v(l') - v(l), \text{ for some } l, l' \text{ such that } \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \sim \{l'\}\}.$$

Step 2: (i) $\bar{w} \in B$, (ii) B is convex, and (iii) if $\bar{w} < 1$, there exists $w' \in B$ with $w' > \bar{w}$.

(i) Since $A = (0, \bar{w})$, there exists a monotone sequence $w^n \rightarrow \bar{w}$ such that $w^n = v(b^n) - v(a^n) < \bar{w}$ and $\{a^n\} \succ \{a^n, b^n\} \succ \{b^n\}$. Since $\{a^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ and $\{b^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ are sequences in $\Delta(C)$, we can assume $a^n \rightarrow a^0$ and $b^n \rightarrow b^0$ without loss of generality. Since v is continuous, $\bar{w} = v(b^0) - v(a^0)$. Moreover, since φ is increasing, $u(a^n) - u(b^n) > \varphi(v(b^n) - v(a^n)) = u(a^n) - U(\{a^n, b^n\}) \geq u(a^1) - U(\{a^1, b^1\}) > 0$. By continuity, $u(a^0) - u(b^0) > 0$. Rankings $\{a^0\} \succ \{b^0\}$ and $v(b^0) > v(a^0)$ imply $\{a^0\} \succ \{a^0, b^0\}$. Set Betweenness and the definition of A imply $\{a^0\} \succ \{a^0, b^0\} \sim \{b^0\}$. Thus $\bar{w} \in B$.

(ii) Take $w, w' \in B$. There exist l, l', k, k' such that $w = v(l') - v(l)$, $w' = v(k') - v(k)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \sim \{l'\}$ and $\{k\} \succ \{k, k'\} \sim \{k'\}$. Then $v(l'\lambda k') - v(l\lambda k) = \lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w'$. Since $v(l'\lambda k') > v(l\lambda k)$ and $u(l\lambda k) > u(l'\lambda k')$, we have $\{l\lambda k\} \succ \{l\lambda k, l'\lambda k'\}$. Set Betweenness implies $\{l\lambda k\} \succ \{l\lambda k, l'\lambda k'\} \succsim \{l'\lambda k'\}$. Moreover, since $\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w' \geq \bar{w}$, $\{l\lambda k\} \succ \{l\lambda k, l'\lambda k'\} \sim \{l'\lambda k'\}$. Thus $\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w' \in B$.

(iii) Let l, l' satisfy $\bar{w} = v(l') - v(l)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \sim \{l'\}$. Since $\bar{w} < 1$, we have either $1 > v(l')$ or $v(l) > 0$. In case of the former, let $l^M \in \Delta(C)$ be a maximal element of v . By Continuity, for all λ sufficiently close to 1, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\lambda l^M\}$. By Set Betweenness, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\lambda l^M\} \succsim \{l'\lambda l^M\}$. Moreover, $v(l'\lambda l^M) - v(l) > v(l') - v(l) = \bar{w}$. By definition of A , we must have $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\lambda l^M\} \sim \{l'\lambda l^M\}$. Hence $\bar{w} < w' \equiv v(l'\lambda l^M) - v(l) \in B$. The symmetric argument works for the latter case.

By Lemma 4.2 (i) and Step 2, $A \cup B$ is an interval in $[0, 1]$ with $\bar{w} \in A \cup B$. For all $w \in A \cup B$, define

$$F(w) \equiv \sup \{u(l) - u(l') \mid w = v(l') - v(l) \text{ for some } \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}\}.$$

Step 3: (i) F is weakly concave on $A \cup B$, (ii) $F(\bar{w}) \leq \bar{\varphi}(\bar{w})$, and (iii) if $\bar{w} < 1$, $F(\bar{w}) = \bar{\varphi}(\bar{w})$.

(i) Take $w, w' \in A \cup B$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. There exist $a^n, b^n, l^n, k^n \in \Delta(C)$ such that $\{a^n\} \succ \{a^n, b^n\}$, $\{l^n\} \succ \{l^n, k^n\}$, $v(b^n) - v(a^n) = w$, $u(k^n) - u(l^n) = w'$, $u(a^n) - u(b^n) \rightarrow F(w)$, and $u(l^n) - u(k^n) \rightarrow F(w')$. Since $v(b^n) > v(a^n)$, $v(k^n) > v(l^n)$, $u(a^n) > u(b^n)$ and $u(l^n) > u(k^n)$, we have $v(b^n \lambda k^n) > v(a^n \lambda l^n)$ and $u(a^n \lambda l^n) > u(b^n \lambda k^n)$. Thus $\{a^n \lambda l^n\} \succ \{a^n \lambda l^n, b^n \lambda k^n\}$. Furthermore,

$$\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w' = \lambda(v(b^n) - v(a^n)) + (1 - \lambda)(v(k^n) - v(l^n)) = v(b^n \lambda k^n) - v(a^n \lambda l^n).$$

Thus

$$\begin{aligned} F(\lambda w + (1 - \lambda)w') &\geq \limsup u(a^n \lambda l^n) - u(b^n \lambda k^n) \\ &= \limsup \lambda(u(a^n) - u(b^n)) + (1 - \lambda)(u(l^n) - u(k^n)) \\ &= \lambda F(w) + (1 - \lambda)F(w'). \end{aligned}$$

(ii) Suppose $F(\bar{w}) > \bar{\varphi}(\bar{w}) = \sup\{\varphi(w) | w \in A\}$. For all $w \in A$ and $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$ such that $w = v(l') - v(l)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \sim \{l'\}$, we have shown in Step 1 that $\varphi(w) \geq u(l) - u(l')$. Thus there exist sequences $w^n \rightarrow \bar{w}$, $\{a^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ and $\{b^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ such that $w^n = v(b^n) - v(a^n) \in A$, $\{a^n\} \succ \{a^n, b^n\} \succ \{b^n\}$, and $u(a^n) - u(b^n) > c > \sup\{\varphi(w) | w \in A\}$, where $c > 0$ is a constant number. Since $\{a^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ and $\{b^n\}_{n=1}^\infty$ are sequences in $\Delta(C)$, we can assume $a^n \rightarrow a^0$ and $b^n \rightarrow b^0$ without loss of generality. Since

$$u(a^n) - u(b^n) > c > \varphi(v(b^n) - v(a^n)) = u(a^n) - U(\{a^n, b^n\}),$$

continuity implies $u(a^0) - u(b^0) > u(a^0) - U(\{a^0, b^0\})$, that is, $U(\{a^0, b^0\}) > u(b^0)$. On the other hand, since $\bar{w} = v(b^0) - v(a^0) > 0$ and $u(a^0) > u(b^0)$, we have $\{a^0\} \succ \{a^0, b^0\}$. Hence $\{a^0\} \succ \{a^0, b^0\} \succ \{b^0\}$, which contradicts $\bar{w} \notin A$.

(iii) By Step 2 (ii) and (iii), $[\bar{w}, w'] \subset B$ for some $w' > \bar{w}$. Since a convex function is continuous on the relative interior of the domain, F is continuous around \bar{w} .

Suppose $F(\bar{w}) < \sup\{\varphi(w) | w \in A\}$. By continuity of F and φ , there exists $w < \bar{w}$ such that $F(w) < \varphi(w)$. There exist a, b such that $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$ and $w = v(b) - v(a)$. Since

$$u(a) - U(\{a, b\}) = \varphi(v(b) - v(a)) > F(w) \geq u(a) - u(b),$$

we have $u(b) > U(\{a, b\})$, which is a contradiction. Hence $F(\bar{w}) = \bar{\varphi}(\bar{w})$.

By Step 3 (ii), when $\bar{w} = 1$, for all a, b with $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$ with $v(b) - v(a) = 1$, we have $\bar{\varphi}(v(b) - v(a)) \geq F(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - u(b)$. Thus, taking Step 1 together, any strictly increasing continuous extension $\bar{\varphi} : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is the desired object.

Now assume $\bar{w} < 1$. By Step 3 (i) and (iii), there exists an affine function $f_1 : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ supporting F at \bar{w} . If its slope is negative, then take any positive affine function f_2 with $f_2(\bar{w}) = \bar{\varphi}(\bar{w})$. Now define

$$\bar{\bar{\varphi}}(w) \equiv \begin{cases} \bar{\varphi}(w) & \text{if } w \in \bar{A}, \\ \max[f_1, f_2] & \text{elsewhere.} \end{cases}$$

Since $\bar{\varphi}(\bar{w}) = f_1(\bar{w}) = f_2(\bar{w})$, $\bar{\varphi}$ is continuous and strictly increasing.

We can verify that $\bar{\varphi}(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - u(b)$ for all a, b such that $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$ and $v(b) - v(a) \geq \bar{w}$. Indeed, by definition of f_1 ,

$$\bar{\varphi}(v(b) - v(a)) \geq f_1(v(b) - v(a)) \geq F(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - u(b).$$

Therefore $U(\{a, b\})$ can be written as the desired form in all the cases.

Finally, suppose in addition that C is finite and \succsim satisfies Properness. Then by Lemma 4.6 (ii), there exists $\bar{K} > 0$ satisfying the statement of the lemma. Let f_3 be the affine function which has slope \bar{K} and $f_3(\bar{w}) = \bar{\varphi}(\bar{w})$. Define

$$\bar{\bar{\varphi}}(w) \equiv \begin{cases} \bar{\varphi}(w) & \text{if } w \in \bar{A}, \\ \max[f_1, f_2, f_3] & \text{elsewhere.} \end{cases}$$

Then $\bar{\bar{\varphi}}$ is convex. By the same argument above, $\bar{\bar{\varphi}}(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - u(b)$ for all a, b such that $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$ and $v(b) - v(a) \geq \bar{w}$. This completes the proof. \square

Lemma 4.8. *For all finite menus $x \in \mathcal{D}$,*

$$U(x) = \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \bar{\varphi} \left(\max_x v - v(l) \right) \right).$$

Proof. First of all, Gul and Pesendorfer [6] show that, if \succsim satisfies Set Betweenness, for all finite menus $x \in \mathcal{D}$,

$$U(x) = \max_{a \in x} \min_{b \in x} U(\{a, b\}) = \min_{b \in x} \max_{a \in x} U(\{a, b\}). \quad (19)$$

Define $\psi : \mathbb{R}_- \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_-$ by $\psi(w) = -\bar{\varphi}(-w)$. Since $\bar{\varphi}$ is increasing, so is ψ . Fix $a \in x$ arbitrarily. Since ψ is increasing,

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{b \in x} U(\{a, b\}) &= \min_{b \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) - \bar{\varphi} \left(\max_{\{a, b\}} v - v(l) \right) \right) \\ &= \min_{b \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{\{a, b\}}(-v) \right) \right) \\ &\geq \min_{b \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{b \in x} \min_{\{a, b\}}(-v) \right) \right) \\ &= \max_{l \in \{a, b^a\}} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{l' \in x}(-v) \right) \right), \end{aligned}$$

where b^a is a minimizer of the associated minimization problem. Since the above inequality holds for all $a \in x$, it follows from (19) that

$$\begin{aligned} U(x) &\geq \max_{a \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b^a\}} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{l' \in x}(-v) \right) \right) \\ &= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{l' \in x}(-v) \right) \right) \\ &= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \bar{\varphi} \left(\max_{l' \in x} v - v(l) \right) \right). \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

Similarly, for all fixed $b \in x$,

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{a \in x} U(\{a, b\}) &= \max_{a \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) - \overline{\varphi} \left(\max_{\{a, b\}} v - v(l) \right) \right) \\
&= \max_{a \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{\{a, b\}} (-v) \right) \right) \\
&\leq \max_{a \in x} \max_{l \in \{a, b\}} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \max_{a \in x} \min_{\{a, b\}} (-v) \right) \right) \\
&= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{\{a^b, b\}} (-v) \right) \right),
\end{aligned}$$

where a^b is a maximizer of the associated maximization problem. Since the above inequality holds for all $b \in x$, it follows from (19) that

$$\begin{aligned}
U(x) &\leq \min_{b \in x} \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{\{a^b, b\}} (-v) \right) \right) \\
&= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{b \in x} \min_{\{a^b, b\}} (-v) \right) \right) \\
&= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) + \psi \left(v(l) + \min_{l' \in x} (-v)(l') \right) \right) \\
&= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \overline{\varphi} \left(\max_{l' \in x} v - v(l) \right) \right). \tag{21}
\end{aligned}$$

Taking (20) and (21) together, the desired result holds. \square

Lemma 4.9. *For all $x \in \mathcal{D}$, U can be written as the desired form.*

Proof. By Lemma 0 of Gul and Pesendorfer [6, p.1421], there exists a sequence of subsets x^n of x such that each x^n is finite and $x^n \rightarrow x$ in the Hausdorff metric. By Lemma 4.8,

$$U(x^n) = \max_{l \in x^n} \left(u(l) - \overline{\varphi} \left(\max_{x^n} v - v(l) \right) \right). \tag{22}$$

Since $\overline{\varphi}$ is continuous, the maximum theorem implies that the RHS of (22) converges to

$$\max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \overline{\varphi} \left(\max_x v - v(l) \right) \right).$$

On the other hand, by Continuity, $U(x^n) \rightarrow U(x)$. This completes the proof. \square

4.2 Necessity Part of Theorem 3.1

Lemma 4.10. *A convex self-control model satisfies Set Betweenness (NEEDS ONLY INCREASING φ).*

Proof. Suppose $x \succsim y$. Since $\max_{x \cup y} v \geq \max_x v$ and φ is increasing, for all $l \in x$,

$$U(x) \geq u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_x v - v(l) \right) \geq u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{x \cup y} v - v(l) \right). \quad (23)$$

Furthermore, since $\max_{x \cup y} v \geq \max_y v$ and φ is increasing, for all $l' \in y$,

$$U(x) \geq U(y) \geq u(l') - \varphi \left(\max_y v - v(l') \right) \geq u(l') - \varphi \left(\max_{x \cup y} v - v(l') \right). \quad (24)$$

Taking (23) and (24) together, $U(x) \geq U(x \cup y)$.

Next we show $U(x \cup y) \geq U(y)$. If $\max_x v \leq \max_y v$, $\max_{x \cup y} v = \max_y v$. Since

$$u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{x \cup y} v - v(l) \right) = u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_y v - v(l) \right) \text{ for all } l,$$

$$\begin{aligned} U(x \cup y) &= \max_{x \cup y} \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{x \cup y} v - v(l) \right) \right) \\ &\geq \max_y \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_y v - v(l) \right) \right) = U(y). \end{aligned}$$

If $\max_x v > \max_y v$, $\max_{x \cup y} v = \max_x v$. Since $u(l) - \varphi(\max_{x \cup y} v - v(l)) = u(l) - \varphi(\max_x v - v(l))$, it follows from the same argument that $U(x \cup y) \geq U(x)$. Hence $U(x \cup y) \geq U(x) \geq U(y)$. \square

Lemma 4.11. *A convex self-control model satisfies Properness.*

Proof. Suppose $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$. From this ranking, we have $v(l') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l')$, and hence $v(l\lambda l') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l\lambda l')$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. Thus $\{l\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\}$.

Let $\bar{v} = \max_{\Delta(C)} v$ and $\underline{v} = \min_{\Delta(C)} v$. Then for all $a, b \in \Delta(C)$ with $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\}$, $v(b) - v(a) \in [0, \bar{v} - \underline{v}]$. Since a convex function is Lipschitz continuous on any compact subset included in the relative interior of the domain (See Rockafellar [14, p.86, Theorem 10.4]), there exists $K > 0$ such that, for all a, b, a', b' with $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\}$ and $\{a'\} \succ \{a', b'\}$,

$$|\varphi(v(b') - v(a')) - \varphi(v(b) - v(a))| \leq K|v(b') - v(a') - (v(b) - v(a))|.$$

Thus we have

$$\varphi(v(l') - v(l)) - \varphi((1 - \lambda)(v(l') - v(l))) \leq K\lambda(v(l') - v(l)). \quad (25)$$

Consider the case that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\} \succ \{l\lambda l'\}$. By (25),

$$\begin{aligned} U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) &= u(l) - \varphi(v(l\lambda l') - v(l)) = u(l) - \varphi((1 - \lambda)(v(l') - v(l))) \\ &\leq u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) + K\lambda(v(l') - v(l)) \leq U(\{l, l'\}) + K|v(l\lambda l') - v(l')| \\ &\leq U(\{l, l'\}) + K\|v\|d(l\lambda l', l'), \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

where $\|v\|$ is the norm of the mixture linear function v .

In case of $\{l\} \succ \{l, l\lambda l'\} \sim \{l\lambda l'\}$,

$$U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}) = u(l\lambda l') \leq u(l') + \|u\|d(l\lambda l', l') \leq U(\{l, l'\}) + \|u\|d(l\lambda l', l'), \quad (27)$$

where $\|u\|$ is the norm of the mixture linear function u .

Let $K^* \equiv \max[\|u\|, K\|v\|]$. Take $\theta \in \Theta$ such that $u(\theta) = K^*$. For all $\varepsilon > 0$ and λ such that $d(l\lambda l', l') < \varepsilon$ and $l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta \in \Delta(C)$, taking (26) and (27) together,

$$\begin{aligned} U(\{l + \varepsilon\theta, l' + \varepsilon\theta\}) &= U(\{l, l'\}) + u(\varepsilon\theta) = U(\{l, l'\}) + \varepsilon K^* \\ &> U(\{l, l'\}) + d(l\lambda l', l')K^* \geq U(\{l, l\lambda l'\}). \end{aligned}$$

□

Lemma 4.12. *A convex self-control model satisfies Translation Invariance (φ CAN BE ARBITRARY).*

Proof. Notice first that, for all mixture linear functions $w : \Delta(C) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $w(l + \theta) = w(l) + w(\theta)$. Thus for all $x \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\theta \in \Theta$,

$$\begin{aligned} U(x + \theta) &= \max_x \left(u(l + \theta) - \varphi \left(\max_x v(l' + \theta) - v(l + \theta) \right) \right) \\ &= \max_x \left(u(l) + u(\theta) - \varphi \left(\max_x v(l') - v(l) \right) \right) \\ &= U(x) + u(\theta). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $U(x) \geq U(y)$ if and only if

$$U(x + \theta) = U(x) + u(\theta) \geq U(y) + u(\theta) = U(y + \theta).$$

□

Lemma 4.13. *A convex self-control model satisfies Temptation Convexity (NEEDS ONLY INCREASING φ).*

Proof. First we show $L_+(l)$ is convex. Take $l', l'' \in L_+(l)$, that is, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l''\}$. This ranking implies $v(l') > v(l)$ and $v(l'') > v(l)$. Since v is mixture linear, $v(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'') > v(l)$. On the other hand, Set Betweenness implies $u(l) > u(l')$ and $u(l) > u(l'')$. Hence $u(l) > u(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'')$. Therefore,

$$u(l) > \max_{\{l, \lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l''\}} (u(k) - \varphi(v(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'') - v(k))),$$

which means $\{l\} \succ \{l, \lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l''\}$. That is, $\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'' \in L_+(l)$.

Next we show $L_-(l)$ is convex. Take $l', l'' \in L_-(l)$, that is, $\{l\} \sim \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $\{l\} \sim \{l, l''\} \succ \{l''\}$. This ranking implies $v(l') \leq v(l)$ and $v(l'') \leq v(l)$. Since v is mixture linear, $v(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'') \leq v(l)$. On the other hand, since u is mixture linear, $u(l) > u(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'')$.

Thus $u(l) = U(\{l, \lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l''\})$, which means $\{l\} \sim \{l, \lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l''\} \succ \{\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l''\}$. That is, $\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'' \in L_-(l)$.

Next we show that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ implies $\{l\} \succ \{l, \lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'\}$. By Set Betweenness, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succsim \{l'\}$. Hence the assumption implies $v(l') > v(l)$. Since u and v are mixture linear, $u(l) > u(\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l')$ and $v(\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l') > v(l)$. Thus the representation implies that $u(l) > U(\{l, \lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'\})$.

Finally, we show that $\{l\} \sim \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ implies $\{l\} \sim \{l, \lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'\} \succ \{\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'\}$. Since $u(l) > u(l')$, mixture linearity implies $u(l) > u(\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l')$. Furthermore, the assumption implies $v(l) \geq v(l')$, and hence $v(l) \geq v(\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l')$. Thus the representation implies that $u(l) = U(\{l, \lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'\})$. \square

Lemma 4.14. *A convex self-control model satisfies Temptation Consistency (NEEDS ONLY INCREASING φ).*

Proof. By assumption, $v(l') = v(l'') > v(l)$. Thus we have $U(\{l, l''\}) \geq u(l) - \varphi(v(l'') - v(l)) - v(l) = u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) = U(\{l, l'\})$. That is, $U(\{l, l''\}) \geq U(\{l, l'\})$. \square

Lemma 4.15. *A convex self-control model satisfies MPSC.*

Proof. (i) By assumption, $v(l') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l')$. Since $U(\{l, l'\}) > u(l')$, $u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) > u(l')$. Since φ is weakly convex with $\varphi(0) = 0$,

$$\lambda u(l) - \lambda u(l') > \lambda \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) \geq \varphi(\lambda(v(l') - v(l))).$$

Thus we have

$$\lambda u(l) + (1 - \lambda)u(l'') - \varphi(\lambda(v(l') - v(l))) > \lambda u(l') + (1 - \lambda)u(l''),$$

equivalently,

$$u(\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'') - \varphi(v(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'') - v(\lambda l + (1 - \lambda)l'')) > u(\lambda l' + (1 - \lambda)l'').$$

Therefore, $u(l\lambda l'') > U(\{l\lambda l'', l'\lambda l''\}) > u(l'\lambda l'')$.

(ii) By assumption, $v(l') > v(l)$, $v(l'') > v(l)$, $u(l) > u(l')$ and $u(l) > u(l'')$. Mixture linearity of u and v implies $u(l) > u(l'\lambda l'')$ and $v(l'\lambda l'') > v(l)$. Since $u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) > u(l')$ and $u(l) - \varphi(v(l'') - v(l)) > u(l'')$, weakly convex φ implies

$$\begin{aligned} & u(l) - \varphi(v(l'\lambda l'') - v(l)) \\ & \geq \lambda u(l) + (1 - \lambda)u(l) - \lambda \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) - (1 - \lambda)\varphi(v(l'') - v(l)) > u(l'\lambda l''). \end{aligned}$$

Thus $u(l) > U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}) > u(l'\lambda l'')$. By definition of singleton equivalent, $u(e(\{l, l'\})) = U(\{l, l'\})$, $u(e(\{l, l''\})) = U(\{l, l''\})$, and $u(e(\{l, l'\lambda l''\})) = U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\})$. Since u is mixture linear and φ is weakly convex,

$$\begin{aligned} u(e(\{l, l'\})\lambda e(\{l, l''\})) &= \lambda U(\{l, l'\}) + (1 - \lambda)U(\{l, l''\}) \\ &= \lambda(u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l))) + (1 - \lambda)(u(l) - \varphi(v(l'') - v(l))) \\ &\leq u(l) - \varphi(v(l'\lambda l'') - v(l)) = U(\{l, l'\lambda l''\}). \end{aligned}$$

\square

Lemma 4.16. *A convex self-control model satisfies Monotone Self-Control.*

Proof. Let $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $\{k\} \succ \{k, k'\}$. For some $h \in \Delta(C)$, $\lambda \in (0, 1]$ and $\theta_l, \theta_k \in \Theta$, assume $l\lambda h + \theta_l = k\lambda h + \theta_k$ and $\{k\lambda h + \theta_k, k'\lambda h + \theta_k\} \succeq \{l\lambda h + \theta_l, l'\lambda h + \theta_l\}$. Since $\{l\lambda h + \theta_l\} \succ \{l\lambda h + \theta_l, l'\lambda h + \theta_l\} \succ \{l'\lambda h + \theta_l\}$,

$$U(\{l\lambda h + \theta_l, l'\lambda h + \theta_l\}) = u(l\lambda h + \theta_l) - \varphi(v(l'\lambda h) - v(l\lambda h)).$$

We will claim that $u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}) \geq u(k) - U(\{k, k'\})$. In case of $\{k\lambda h\} \succ \{k\lambda h, k'\lambda h\} \succ \{k'\lambda h\}$, we have also

$$U(\{k\lambda h + \theta_k, k'\lambda h + \theta_k\}) = u(k\lambda h + \theta_k) - \varphi(v(k'\lambda h) - v(k\lambda h)).$$

It follows from the assumption that $\varphi(\lambda(v(l') - v(l))) \geq \varphi(\lambda(v(k') - v(k)))$. Since φ is strictly increasing, this inequality is equivalent to saying that $\varphi(v(l') - v(l)) \geq \varphi(v(k') - v(k))$. Since $U(\{l, l'\}) = u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l))$ and $U(\{k, k'\}) \geq u(k) - \varphi(v(k') - v(k))$, we have $u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}) \geq u(k) - U(\{k, k'\})$.

If $\{k\lambda h\} \succ \{k\lambda h, k'\lambda h\} \sim \{k'\lambda h\}$, $U(\{k\lambda h + \theta_k, k'\lambda h + \theta_k\}) = u(k'\lambda h + \theta_k)$. By the assumption,

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi(\lambda(v(l') - v(l))) &= u(l\lambda h + \theta_l) - U(\{l\lambda h + \theta_l, l'\lambda h + \theta_l\}) \\ &\geq u(k\lambda h + \theta_k) - U(\{k\lambda h + \theta_k, k'\lambda h + \theta_k\}) \\ &= u(k\lambda h + \theta_k) - u(k'\lambda h + \theta_k) = \lambda(u(k) - u(k')). \end{aligned}$$

Since φ is weakly convex with $\varphi(0) = 0$,

$$\lambda\varphi(v(l') - v(l)) \geq \varphi(\lambda(v(l') - v(l))) \geq \lambda(u(k) - u(k')),$$

that is, $u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}) = \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) \geq u(k) - u(k') \geq u(k) - U(\{k, k'\})$. The last inequality follows from Set Betweenness.

For all $e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l, e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k \in \Delta(C)$ with $e(\{l\}) + \theta_l = e(\{k\}) + \theta_k \in \Delta(C)$,

$$\begin{aligned} u(e(\{l\}) + \theta_l) - u(e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l) &= u(l) - U(\{l, l'\}) \geq u(k) - U(\{k, k'\}) \\ &= u(e(\{k\}) + \theta_k) - u(e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k). \end{aligned}$$

Thus $\{e(\{k, k'\}) + \theta_k\} \succeq \{e(\{l, l'\}) + \theta_l\}$. □

4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2

(i) By assumption, for all $w' \in \mathbb{R}_+$, $\varphi'(w') = \alpha_u \varphi(\frac{w'}{\alpha_v})$. Since

$$\begin{aligned} U'(x) &= \max_{l \in x} \left(\alpha_u u(l) + \beta_u - \alpha_u \varphi \left(\frac{\alpha_v (\max_x v - v(l))}{\alpha_v} \right) \right) \\ &= \alpha_u \left\{ \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_x v - v(l) \right) \right) \right\} + \beta_u \\ &= \alpha_u U(x) + \beta_u, \end{aligned}$$

U' and U represent the same preference.

We turn to the converse. Since mixture linear functions $U(\{l\}) = u(l)$ and $U'(\{l\}) = u'(\{l\})$ represent the same preference over $\Delta(C)$, they are cardinally equivalent by the standard argument. That is, there exist $\alpha_u > 0$ and $\beta_u \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $u' = \alpha_u u + \beta_u$.

Next we claim that mixture linear functions v and v' represent the identical preference over $\Delta(C)$.

Lemma 4.17. *For all $l, l' \in \Delta(C)$, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ if and only if $u(l) > u(l')$ and $v(l') > v(l)$. Similarly, $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\}$ if and only if $u'(l) > u'(l')$ and $v'(l') > v'(l)$.*

Proof. If part: By assumption, $u(l) > u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l))$ and $u(l) > u(l')$. Thus the associated representation implies $u(l) > U(\{l, l'\})$. Only-if part: Since the representation satisfies Set Betweenness, $u(l) > U(\{l, l'\}) \geq u(l')$, that is, $u(l) > u(l')$. Suppose $v(l) \geq v(l')$. Then the representation implies $u(l) = u(l) - \varphi(v(l) - v(l')) > u(l') - \varphi(v(l) - v(l'))$, that is, $U(\{l, l'\}) = u(l)$. This is a contradiction. The exactly same argument works for (u', v', φ') . \square

Suppose by contradiction that v and v' are not identical. Then there exist l, l' satisfying $v(l') > v(l)$ and $v'(l') \leq v'(l)$. Let l^M and l^m be a maximal lottery and a minimal lottery with respect to v' . Since \succsim is a self-control preference, there exist $k, k' \in \Delta(C)$ such that $\{k\} \succ \{k, k'\} \succ \{k'\}$. Thus by Lemma 4.17, $v'(l^M) \geq v'(k') > v'(k) \geq v'(l^m)$. Since v is continuous and v' is mixture linear, we can find small $\lambda > 0$ such that $v'(l^m \lambda l') < v'(l^M \lambda l)$ and $v(l^m \lambda l') > v(l^M \lambda l)$. Redefine l and l' as $l^M \lambda l$ and $l^m \lambda l'$, respectively. If either $u(l) > u(l')$ or $u(l') > u(l)$, this contradicts Lemma 4.17 because $v(l') > v(l)$ and $v'(l) > v'(l')$. Suppose $u(l) = u(l')$. Since $\{k\} \succ \{k'\}$, u is not degenerate. Let l^+ and l^- be a maximal lottery and a minimal lottery with respect to u . Since v, v' are continuous and u is mixture linear, there exists a small $\mu > 0$ such that $u(l^+ \mu l) > u(l^- \mu l')$, $v(l^- \mu l') > v(l^+ \mu l)$ and $v'(l^+ \mu l) > v'(l^- \mu l')$. Again, this contradicts Lemma 4.17. Thus v and v' induce the identical preference over $\Delta(C)$. Since v and v' are mixture linear, there exist $\alpha_v > 0$ and $\beta_v \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $v' = \alpha_v v + \beta_v$.

Since $v' = \alpha_v v + \beta_v$,

$$\begin{aligned} W(u', v', \varphi') &= \{v'(l') - v'(l) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid l, l' \in \Delta(C) \text{ with } \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}\} \\ &= \{\alpha_v(v(l') - v(l)) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid l, l' \in \Delta(C) \text{ with } \{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}\} \\ &= \alpha_v W(u, v, \varphi). \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 4.18. *If U and U' represent the same preference and $u' = \alpha_u u + \beta_u$, then $U' = \alpha_u U + \beta_u$.*

Proof. Let l^+ and l^- be a maximal lottery and a minimal lottery with respect to u . By Set Betweenness and Continuity, $\{l^+\} \succsim x \succsim \{l^-\}$ for all $x \in \mathcal{D}$. Thus there exists a unique $\lambda(x) \in [0, 1]$ such that $x \sim \{\lambda(x)l^+ + (1 - \lambda(x))l^-\}$. Since u and u' are mixture linear,

$$\begin{aligned} U'(x) &= u'(\lambda(x)l^+ + (1 - \lambda(x))l^-) = \lambda(x)u'(l^+) + (1 - \lambda(x))u'(l^-) \\ &= \lambda(x)(\alpha_u u(l^+) + \beta_u) + (1 - \lambda(x))(\alpha_u u(l^-) + \beta_u) \\ &= \alpha_u(\lambda(x)u(l^+) + (1 - \lambda(x))u(l^-)) + \beta_u = \alpha_u U(x) + \beta_u. \end{aligned}$$

□

Since $u' = \alpha_u u + \beta_u$ and $v' = \alpha_v v + \beta_v$, for all $x \in \mathcal{D}$,

$$\begin{aligned} U'(x) &= \max_{l \in x} \left(u'(l) - \varphi' \left(\max_{l' \in x} v'(l') - v'(l) \right) \right) \\ &= \max_{l \in x} \left(\alpha_u u(l) + \beta_u - \varphi' \left(\alpha_v \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right) \right) \\ &= \alpha_u \left\{ \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \frac{1}{\alpha_u} \varphi' \left(\alpha_v \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right) \right) \right\} + \beta_u. \end{aligned}$$

By Lemma 4.18,

$$\begin{aligned} U(x) &= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \varphi \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right) \\ &= \max_{l \in x} \left(u(l) - \frac{1}{\alpha_u} \varphi' \left(\alpha_v \left(\max_{l' \in x} v(l') - v(l) \right) \right) \right). \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

Take any $w \in W(u, v, \varphi)$. There exist l, l' such that $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$ and $w = v(l') - v(l)$. Since $v(l') > v(l)$ and $u(l) > u(l')$, it follows from (28) that

$$u(l) - \varphi(v(l') - v(l)) = U(\{l, l'\}) = u(l) - \frac{1}{\alpha_u} \varphi'(\alpha_v(v(l') - v(l))),$$

and hence $\varphi'(\alpha_v w) = \alpha_u \varphi(w)$.

(ii) Take any continuous and strictly increasing function $\varphi' : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ such that $\varphi' = \varphi$ on the closure of $W(u, v, \varphi)$ and $\varphi' \geq \varphi$ elsewhere. Let U' be the functional form associated with (u, v, φ') .

Lemma 4.19. $W(u, v, \varphi)$ is an interval with $\inf W(u, v, \varphi) = 0$.

Proof. It suffices to show that, for all $w \in W(u, v, \varphi)$, $\lambda w \in W(u, v, \varphi)$ for all $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. Let $w \in W(u, v, \varphi)$. There exist l, l' such that $w = v(l') - v(l)$ and $\{l\} \succ \{l, l'\} \succ \{l'\}$. Since a convex self-control model satisfies MPSC (i), $\{l\} \succ \{l, l(1 - \lambda)l'\} \succ \{l(1 - \lambda)l'\}$. Thus $\lambda w = \lambda(v(l') - v(l)) = v(l(1 - \lambda)l') - v(l) \in W(u, v, \varphi)$. □

By Lemma 4.19, $\varphi'(0) = \varphi(0) = 0$.

Lemma 4.20. For all binary menus $\{a, b\}$, $U(\{a, b\}) = U'(\{a, b\})$.

Proof. Assume $\{a\} \succ \{b\}$ without loss of generality. By Set Betweenness, $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$. There are four cases. Case 1: $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$. This ranking implies $v(b) > v(a)$ and $u(a) > u(b)$. Since $v(b) - v(a) \in W(u, v, \varphi)$, $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) - \varphi(v(b) - v(a)) = u(a) - \varphi'(v(b) - v(a))$, and hence $U(\{a, b\}) = U'(\{a, b\})$. Case 2: $\{a\} \succ \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$. This ranking implies $v(b) > v(a)$ and $u(a) > u(b)$. The representation U implies $\varphi(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - u(b)$. Since $\varphi' \geq \varphi$ on \mathbb{R}_+ , $\varphi'(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - u(b)$, and hence $U(\{a, b\}) =$

$u(b) = U'(\{a, b\})$. Case 3: $\{a\} \sim \{a, b\} \succ \{b\}$. By definition, $b \in L_-(a)$. By construction of v , $v(a) \geq v(b)$. Since $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) > u(b) - \varphi(v(a) - v(b))$ and $\varphi' \geq \varphi$, $u(a) > u(b) - \varphi'(v(a) - v(b))$. Thus $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) = U'(\{a, b\})$. Finally, (iv) $\{a\} \sim \{a, b\} \sim \{b\}$. If $v(b) \geq v(a)$, $U(\{a, b\}) = u(b) \geq u(a) - \varphi(v(b) - v(a)) \geq u(a) - \varphi'(v(b) - v(a))$. If $v(a) \geq v(b)$, we have $U(\{a, b\}) = u(a) \geq u(b) - \varphi(v(a) - v(b)) \geq u(b) - \varphi'(v(a) - v(b))$. In either case, $U(\{a, b\}) = U'(\{a, b\})$. \square

Notice that any functional form U'' with components (u'', v'', φ'') defined as (9) satisfies Set Betweenness as long as φ'' is increasing (See Lemma 4.10), U' satisfies Set Betweenness. Gul and Pesendorfer [6] show that, if the preference induced by a representation U'' satisfies Set Betweenness, for all finite menus $x \in \mathcal{D}$, $U''(x) = \max_{a \in x} \min_{b \in x} U''(\{a, b\}) = \min_{b \in x} \max_{a \in x} U''(\{a, b\})$. Thus we have, for all finite menus x ,

$$U(x) = \max_{a \in x} \min_{b \in x} U(\{a, b\}) = \max_{a \in x} \min_{b \in x} U'(\{a, b\}) = U'(x).$$

Hence by continuity of U and U' , $U = U'$.

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