

7. Choquet Integral

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Ellsberg Paradox

- ▶ An urn contains 30 Red balls and 60 Green and Blue balls.

$$\Omega = \{R, G, B\}$$

- ▶ Bets (or acts)

- ▶ $f_R(R) = 10, f_R(G) = 0, f_R(B) = 0$

- ▶ $f_G(R) = 0, f_G(G) = 10, f_G(B) = 0$

- ▶ $f_{RB}(R) = 10, f_{RB}(G) = 0, f_{RB}(B) = 10$

- ▶ $f_{GB}(R) = 0, f_{GB}(G) = 10, f_{GB}(B) = 10$

- ▶ Typical preferences:

$$f_R \succ f_G \text{ and } f_{RB} \prec f_{GB}$$

▶ Expected utility theory fails to explain these preferences.

▶ p : probability measure on Ω

$u: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$: utility function ($0 = u(0) \neq u(10)$)

▶ $\int u(f_R)dp = p(\{R\})u(10)$, $\int u(f_G)dp = p(\{G\})u(10)$

$\int u(f_{RB})dp = p(\{R, B\})u(10)$,

$\int u(f_{GB})dp = p(\{G, B\})u(10)$

▶ $\int u(f_R)dp > \int u(f_G)dp \iff p(\{R\}) > p(\{G\})$

$\int u(f_{RB})dp < \int u(f_{GB})dp \iff p(\{R\}) < p(\{G\})$

... contradiction!

Capacities

- ▶ $\Omega = \{1, \dots, n\}$: (Finite) state space

Definition 7.1

$v: 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is called a *capacity* if it satisfies the following:

1. $v(\emptyset) = 0$,
2. $v(\Omega) = 1$, and
3. $v(E) \leq v(F)$ whenever $E \subset F$.

- ▶ A capacity v is *additive* if $v(E) + v(F) = v(E \cap F)$ for all $E, F \subset \Omega$ with $E \cap F = \emptyset$.
 - ▶ *Probability measures* are a special case of capacities.
- ▶ A capacity v is *convex* if it is supermodular with respect to \subset :
 $v(E) + v(F) \leq v(E \cup F) + v(E \cap F)$ for all $E, F \subset \Omega$.

Choquet Integral

- ▶ For $X: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, order the states so that $X(\omega_1) \leq \dots \leq X(\omega_n)$.
- ▶ We write $v(X \geq t) = v(\{\omega \in \Omega \mid X(\omega) \geq t\})$.

Definition 7.2

For $X: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, the *Choquet integral* of X with respect to capacity v is defined by

$$\begin{aligned}\int X dv &= \int_0^\infty v(X \geq t) dt + \int_{-\infty}^0 (v(X \geq t) - 1) dt \\ &= X(\omega_1) + \sum_{k=2}^n (X(\omega_k) - X(\omega_{k-1})) v(\{\omega_k, \dots, \omega_n\}) \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^n X(\omega_k) (v(\{\omega_k, \dots, \omega_n\}) - v(\{\omega_{k+1}, \dots, \omega_n\})).\end{aligned}$$

Properties

1. $\int \mathbf{1}_E dv = v(E)$ for any $E \subset \Omega$.
2. [Monotonicity] If $X \leq Y$, then $\int X dv \leq \int Y dv$.
3. [Homogeneity] $\int tX dv = t \int X dv$ for any $t \geq 0$.
4. [Comonotonic additivity] If X and Y are *comonotonic*, i.e., $(X(\omega) - X(\omega'))(Y(\omega) - Y(\omega')) \geq 0$ for all $\omega, \omega' \in \Omega$, then $\int (X + Y) dv = \int X dv + \int Y dv$.
5. If v is additive, then $\int X dv = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} X(\omega)v(\{\omega\})$.

Choquet Expected Utility Theory

- ▶ A preference relation \succsim on the set of functions from Ω to \mathbb{R} admits a Choquet expected utility representation if there exist a capacity v and a utility function u such that

$$f \succsim g \iff \int u(f)dv \leq \int u(g)dv.$$

Ellsberg Paradox “Resolved”

- ▶ $\Omega = \{R, G, B\}$
- ▶ Bets
 - ▶ $f_R(R) = 10, f_R(G) = 0, f_R(B) = 0$
 - ▶ $f_G(R) = 0, f_G(G) = 10, f_G(B) = 0$
 - ▶ $f_{RB}(R) = 10, f_{RB}(G) = 0, f_{RB}(B) = 10$
 - ▶ $f_{GB}(R) = 0, f_{GB}(G) = 10, f_{GB}(B) = 10$
- ▶ $f_R \succ f_G$ and $f_{RB} \prec f_{GB}$

▶ Assume $0 = u(0) < u(10)$.

▶ For a capacity v ,

$$\int u(f_R)dv = v(\{R\})u(10), \quad \int u(f_G)dv = v(\{G\})u(10)$$

$$\int u(f_{RB})dv = v(\{R, B\})u(10),$$

$$\int u(f_{GB})dv = v(\{G, B\})u(10)$$

▶ If, for example,

$$v(\{R\}) = v(\{R, G\}) = v(\{R, B\}) = \frac{1}{3},$$

$$v(\{G\}) = v(\{B\}) = 0, \quad v(\{G, B\}) = \frac{2}{3},$$

then

$$\int u(f_R)dv = \frac{1}{3}u(10) > \int u(f_G)dv = 0,$$

$$\int u(f_{RB})dv = \frac{1}{3}u(10) < \int u(f_{GB})dv = \frac{2}{3}u(10).$$

- ▶ This capacity v is not additive and is convex.
- ▶ In particular,

$$v(\{R, G\}) + v(\{R, B\}) = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3} < v(\{R\}) + v(\Omega) = \frac{1}{3} + 1.$$

- ▶ Perception of uncertainty/ambiguity + aversion to uncertainty/ambiguity

Maxmin Expected Utility Theory

- ▶ Denote by Δ the set of probability measures on Ω :

$$\Delta = \{p \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid p_i \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1\}.$$

- ▶ A preference relation \succsim on the set of functions from Ω to \mathbb{R} admits a maxmin expected utility representation if there exist a convex closed set $C \subset \Delta$ and a utility function u such that

$$f \succsim g \iff \min_{p \in C} \int u(f) dp \leq \min_{p \in C} \int u(g) dp.$$

- ▶ Non-singleton C \cdots perception of uncertainty/ambiguity
 $\min_{p \in C}$ \cdots aversion to uncertainty/ambiguity

Ellsberg Paradox “Resolved”

- ▶ $\Omega = \{R, G, B\}$
- ▶ Bets
 - ▶ $f_R(R) = 10, f_R(G) = 0, f_R(B) = 0$
 - ▶ $f_G(R) = 0, f_G(G) = 10, f_G(B) = 0$
 - ▶ $f_{RB}(R) = 10, f_{RB}(G) = 0, f_{RB}(B) = 10$
 - ▶ $f_{GB}(R) = 0, f_{GB}(G) = 10, f_{GB}(B) = 10$
- ▶ $f_R \succ f_G$ and $f_{RB} \prec f_{GB}$

▶ Assume $0 = u(0) < u(10)$.

▶ Let, for example,

$$C = \{p \in \Delta \mid p(\{R\}) = \frac{1}{3}\}.$$

▶ Then

$$\min_{p \in C} \int u(f_R) dp = \frac{1}{3}u(10) > \min_{p \in C} \int u(f_G) dp = 0,$$

$$\min_{p \in C} \int u(f_{RB}) dp = \frac{1}{3}u(10) < \min_{p \in C} \int u(f_{GB}) dp = \frac{2}{3}u(10).$$

Relationship

- ▶ The *core* of capacity v :

$$C(v) = \{p \in \Delta \mid p(E) \geq v(E) \text{ for all } E \subset \Omega\}.$$

Proposition 7.1

For a capacity v , define $I(X) = \int X dv$ ($X: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$).

The following statements are equivalent:

1. v is convex.
2. $I(X) = \min_{p \in C(v)} \int X dp$ for all $X: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.
3. $I(X + Y) \geq I(X) + I(Y)$ for all $X, Y: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.

- ▶ Under homogeneity, 3 is equivalent to concavity of I .

- ▶ Recall the capacity v given by

$$\begin{aligned}v(\{R\}) &= v(\{R, G\}) = v(\{R, B\}) = \frac{1}{3}, \\v(\{G\}) &= v(\{B\}) = 0, \quad v(\{G, B\}) = \frac{2}{3},\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ $C(v) = \{p \in \Delta \mid p(\{R\}) = \frac{1}{3}\}$.

- ▶ Bets

- ▶ $f_R(R) = 10, f_R(G) = 0, f_R(B) = 0$

- ▶ $f_G(R) = 0, f_G(G) = 10, f_G(B) = 0$

- ▶ $f_B(R) = 0, f_B(G) = 0, f_B(B) = 10$.

$$f_{RB} = f_R + f_B, \quad f_{GB} = f_G + f_B$$

- ▶ $I(f_R + f_B) > I(f_R) + I(f_B), I(f_G + f_B) > I(f_G) + I(f_B)$
Compatible with $I(f_R) > I(f_G), I(f_R + f_B) < I(f_G + f_B)$.

Proof of Proposition 7.1

- ▶ $1 \Rightarrow 2$: By Propositions 5.2 and 6.9.
- ▶ Indeed, fix any $X: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and suppose that $X(\omega_1) \leq \dots \leq X(\omega_n)$.
- ▶ Let $\alpha^\sigma \in \Delta$ be the marginal contribution vector associated with permutation $\sigma = (\omega_n, \dots, \omega_1)$.

Then by the definition of the Choquet integral, we have $\int X dv = \int X d\alpha^\sigma$.

- ▶ Also, by the definition of the Choquet integral, we have $\int X dv \leq \int X dp$ for any $p \in C(v)$.
- ▶ Since $\alpha^\sigma \in C(v)$ by the convexity of v (Proposition 5.2), we therefore have $\int X dv = \min_{p \in C(v)} \int X dp$.

▶ $2 \Rightarrow 3$:

Let $p \in C(v)$ be such that $I(X + Y) = \int (X + Y) dp$.

▶ Then $I(X + Y) = \int X dp + \int Y dp \geq I(X) + I(Y)$.

▶ $3 \Rightarrow 1$:

Fix any $E, F \subset \Omega$.

▶ Since $\mathbf{1}_{E \cup F}$ and $\mathbf{1}_{E \cap F}$ are comonotonic, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & v(E \cup F) + v(E \cap F) \\ &= I(\mathbf{1}_{E \cup F}) + I(\mathbf{1}_{E \cap F}) \\ &= I(\mathbf{1}_{E \cup F} + \mathbf{1}_{E \cap F}) \quad (\text{by comonotonic additivity}) \\ &= I(\mathbf{1}_E + \mathbf{1}_F) \\ &\geq I(\mathbf{1}_E) + I(\mathbf{1}_F) = v(E) + v(F). \end{aligned}$$