Topics in Economic Theory I (Summer 2011)

OYAMA Daisuke
oyama@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Wednesday 15:00-16:40
First session May 11 (Wed)
Class room 4¶µ → 203

This course discusses theories and applications of population games. The topics include myopic evolutionary dynamics and forward-looking expectations dynamics as well as applications to industrialization/economic development and economic geography. If time permits, we also discuss the formal relationship between dynamic games and incomplete information games.


Schedule
Date Topic Reading
5/11 (Wed) Population games: introduction
5/14 (Sat) Application: economic geography Krugman (1991a)
Oyama (2009a), Sections 2.1-2.3, 3.1-3.2
5/18 (Wed) Application: economic geography Krugman (1991a)
Oyama (2009a), Sections 2.1-2.3, 3.1-3.2
5/25 (Wed) Application: economic geography Krugman (1991a)
Oyama (2009a), Sections 2.1-2.3, 3.1-3.2
6/1 (Wed) Application: industrialization Matsuyama (1992)
6/8 (Wed) Evolutionary dynamics in potential games Sandholm (2001)
Oyama (2009a), Appendix B
6/15 (Wed) Perfect foresight dynamics in potential games Hofbauer and Sorger (1999)
Oyama (2009a), Appendix C.1
6/22 (Wed) Perfect foresight dynamics in potential games Hofbauer and Sorger (1999)
Oyama (2009a), Appendix C.2
7/6 (Wed) Another class of forward-looking expectations dynamics Krugman (1991b), Fukao and Benabou (1993)
Oyama (2009b) Slides New
7/13 (Wed) Robustness of equilibria to incomplete information Kajii and Morris (1997a, b), Ui (2001)
Oyama and Tercieux (2009), Section 3
7/27 (Wed) Robustness of equilibria to incomplete information Kajii and Morris (1997a, b), Ui (2001)
Oyama and Tercieux (2009), Section 3

Related papers include:

See also:


No class:
6/25 (Sat), 6/29 (Wed), 7/20 (Wed)