Topics in Economic Theory II (Winter 2011)

OYAMA Daisuke
oyama@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

In this course, we read papers on dynamic coordination games.
Paticipants take turns to present papers from the list (free-riding is not allowed). We do not attempt to read many papers, but rather focus on a small number of papers. Presenters should discuss the assigned paper in detail.

1. S. Morris and H. S. Shin (1998). ``Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks,'' American Economic Review 88, 587-597.

2. C. Chamley (1999). ``Coordinating Regime Switches,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 869-905.

3. D. Acemoglu and M. O. Jackson (2011). ``History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Cooperation.''

4. K. Burdzy, D. M. Frankel, and A. Pauzner (2001). ``Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World,'' Econometrica 69, 163-189. [Working paper version]

5. Z. He and W. Xiong (2011). ``Dynamic Debt Runs,'' forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies.

Related Papers

• Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993). ``Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,'' Econometrica 61, 989-1018.
• Kim, Y. (1996). ``Equilibrium Selection in n-Person Coordination Games,'' Games and Economic Behavior 15, 203-227.
• Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner (2003). ``Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' Journal of Economic Theory 108, 1-44.
• Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998). ``Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks,'' American Economic Review 88, 587-597.
• Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2003). ``Global Games: Theory and Applications,'' in M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and S. J. Turnovsky, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Eighth World Congress, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. [download]

• Burdzy, K., D. M. Frankel, and A. Pauzner (2001). ``Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World,'' Econometrica 69, 163-189.
• Colla, P. and F. Garcia (2004). ``Technology Adoption with Forward Looking Agents,'' mimeo.
• Frankel, D. (2010). ``Shocks and Crises in the Long Run.''
• Frankel, D. (2011). ``Rent Seeking and Economic Fragility.''
• Frankel, D. and A. Pauzner (2000). ``Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 285-304.
• Giannitsarou, C. and F. Toxvaerd (2003). ``Recursive Global Games,'' mimeo.
• Guimaeres, B. (2006). ``Dynamics of Currency Crises with Asset Market Frictions,'' Journal of International Economics 68, 141-158.
• Heidhues, P. and N. Melissas (2006). `Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects,'' Economic Theory 28, 531-557.
• Oyama, D. (2004). ``Booms and Slumps in a Game of Sequential Investment with the Changing Fundamentals,'' Japanese Economic Review 55, 311-320.
• Steiner, J. (2008). ``Coordination Cycles,'' Games and Economic Behavior 63, 308-327.
• Steiner, J. (2008). ``Coordination of Mobile Labor,'' Journal of Economic Theory 139, 25-46.
• Yang, H. (2010). ``Information Aggregation and Investment Cycles with Strategic Complementarity,'' Economic Theory 43, 281-311.

• Morris, S. (1995). ``Cooperation and Timing.''
• Abreu, D. and M. K. Brunnermeier (2003). ``Bubbles and Crashes,'' Econometrica 71, 173-204.

• Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997a). ``The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,'' Econometrica 65, 1283-1309.
• Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997b). ``Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey.''
• Ui, T. (2001). ``Robust Equilibria of Potential Games,'' Econometrica 69, 1373-1380.
• Morris, S. and T. Ui (2005). ``Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory 124, 45-78.
• Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2009). ``Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1726-1769.
• Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2010). ``Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors,'' Journal of Economic Theory 145, 752-784.
• Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2011). ``On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors,'' forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.
• Basteck, C. and T. R. Daniels (2011). ``Every Symmetric 3 × 3 Global Game of Strategic Complementarities Has Noise-Independent Selection,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 749-754.
• Honda, J. (2011). ``Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games and Monotone Potential Maximizer: A Symmetric 3 × 3 Example,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 663-669.
• Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2011). ``On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 683-688.

• Morris, S. (1997). ``Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching.''
• Morris, S. (1999). ``Potential Methods in Interaction Games.''
• Morris, S. (2000). ``Contagion,'' Review of Economic Studies 67, 57-78.
• Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2005). ``Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games.''
• Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2010). ``Contagion and Uninvadability in Social Networks with Bilingual Option.''
• Takahashi, S. (2008). ``Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Games with Linear Incentives and Time Symmetry,'' International Journal of Game Theory 37, 15-38.