2. Consumer Choice

Daisuke Oyama

Microeconomics I

April 24, 2025

Consumption

- Commodities $\ell = 1, \dots, L$
- Consumption set $X \subset \mathbb{R}^L$

In most cases, we assume $X = \mathbb{R}^L_+$.

•
$$x = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_L \end{pmatrix} \in X$$
: consumption vector/bundle

Budget Sets

$$\blacktriangleright p = \begin{pmatrix} p_1 \\ \vdots \\ p_L \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^L: \text{ price vector}$$

In most cases, we assume $p \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^L$, or $p \gg 0$ (i.e., $p_{\ell} > 0$ for all $\ell = 1, \dots, L$).

▶ $w \in \mathbb{R}$: wealth level

We assume w > 0.

Budget sets:

$$B_{p,w} = \{x \in X \mid p \cdot x \le w\}$$
 $(p \gg 0, w > 0)$

Two Approaches

This chapter: choice-based

•
$$\mathcal{B} = \{B_{p,w} \mid p \gg 0, w > 0\}$$

- Choice rule is given
- Next chapter: preference-based
 - $\blacktriangleright \succsim {\rm on} \; X$
 - Choice rule is derived by preference (or utility) maximization

Demand Correspondences/Functions

• Choice rule:
$$x(p,w) \subset B_{p,w}$$

 $\cdots \ {\sf Walrasian} \ {\sf demand} \ {\sf correspondence}$

If x(p, w) is a singleton set for all (p, w), we refer to it as a Walrasian demand *function*.

Definition 2.1

Demand correspondence x(p,w) is homogeneous of degree zero if for any $p \gg 0$ and w > 0, we have $x(\alpha p, \alpha w) = x(p,w)$ for all $\alpha > 0$.

For any
$$\alpha > 0$$
, $B_{\alpha p,\alpha w} = B_{p,w}$.

Definition 2.2

Demand correspondence x(p, w) satisfies Walras' law if for any $p \gg 0$ and w > 0, we have $p \cdot x = w$ for all $x \in x(p, w)$.

Comparative Statics

- In the following, we assume that x(p, w) is a function and is differentiable.
- Wealth effects:

$$D_w x(p, w) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial x}(p, w) \\ \vdots \\ \frac{\partial x_L}{\partial x}(p, w) \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times 1}$$

Price effects:

$$D_p x(p, w) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1}(p, w) & \cdots & \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_L}(p, w) \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial x_L}{\partial p_1}(p, w) & \cdots & \frac{\partial x_L}{\partial p_L}(p, w) \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times L}$$

Implication of Homogeneity

Proposition 2.1

If the demand function x(p,w) is homogeneous of degree zero, then for any $p \gg 0$ and w > 0,

$$\sum_{k=1}^{L} \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial p_{k}}(p, w)p_{k} + \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial w}(p, w)w = 0 \qquad (\ell = 1, \dots, L),$$

or in matrix notation,

 $D_p x(p, w)p + D_w x(p, w)w = 0.$

Implications of Walras' Law

Proposition 2.2

If the demand function x(p,w) satisfies Walras' law, then for any $p \gg 0$ and w > 0,

$$x_k(p,w) + \sum_{\ell=1}^L p_\ell \frac{\partial x_\ell}{\partial p_k}(p,w) = 0 \qquad (k = 1,\dots,L),$$

or in matrix notation,

$$x(p,w)^{\mathrm{T}} + p^{\mathrm{T}}D_p x(p,w) = 0^{\mathrm{T}}.$$

Implications of Walras' Law

Proposition 2.3

If the demand function x(p,w) satisfies Walras' law, then for any $p \gg 0$ and w > 0,

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} p_{\ell} \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial w}(p, w) = 1,$$

or in matrix notation,

$$p^{\mathrm{T}} D_w x(p, w) = 1.$$

Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)

Recall:

 (\mathcal{B}, C) satisfies WARP if and only if the following holds:

For any $x, y \in X$ and any $B, B' \in \mathcal{B}$, if $x, y \in B \cap B'$, $x \in C(B')$, and $y \in C(B)$, then $y \in C(B')$ (and $x \in C(B)$).

Suppose that the choice rule x(p, w) is singleton-valued.
 Then WARP is translated into:

For any (p, w) and (p', w'), if $x(p', w') \in B_{p,w}$ and $x(p, w) \in B_{p',w'}$, then x(p, w) = x(p', w').

Definition 2.3

The demand function x(p, w) satisfies the WARP if the following condition holds:

For any (p,w) and (p',w'), if $p'\cdot x(p,w)\leq w'$ and $x(p,w)\neq x(p',w'),$ then $p\cdot x(p',w')>w.$

Proposition 2.4

Suppose that the demand function x(p,w) satisfies Walras' law. Then x(p,w) satisfies the WARP if and only if the following condition holds:

For any (p,w) and (p',w'), if $p'\cdot x(p,w)=w'$ and $x(p,w)\neq x(p',w'),$ then $p\cdot x(p',w')>w.$

Proof

Assume:

For any (p,w) and $(p^\prime,w^\prime)\text{,}$

 $p'\cdot x(p,w)=w',\ p\cdot x(p',w')\leq w\Rightarrow x(p,w)=x(p',w').$

Call this condition "WARP*".

We want to show that WARP holds:

For any (p,w) and $(p^\prime,w^\prime)\text{,}$

 $p' \cdot x(p,w) \le w', \ p \cdot x(p',w') \le w \Rightarrow x(p,w) = x(p',w').$

Fix any (p, w) and (p', w'), and write x = x(p, w) and x' = x(p', w'). Suppose that $p' \cdot x \leq w'$ and $p \cdot x' \leq w$ hold. • We show that under Walras' law and WARP*, we cannot have $p' \cdot x < w'$ (and we cannot have $p \cdot x' < w$),

i.e., we must have $p' \cdot x = w'$ (and $p \cdot x' = w$).

• Then WARP* implies that x = x'.

Suppose that $p' \cdot x < w'$ holds.

► If p · x' = w, then by WARP*, we would have x = x' and p' · x' < w', which contradicts Walras' law.</p>

▶ Therefore, we have
$$p \cdot x' < w$$
.

• Let
$$\alpha \in (0,1)$$
 be such that

$$(\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)p') \cdot x = (\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)p') \cdot x'.$$

(I.e., let
$$\alpha = \frac{p' \cdot x' - p' \cdot x}{(p \cdot x - p \cdot x') + (p' \cdot x' - p' \cdot x)} \in (0, 1).$$
)
 $(p \cdot x = w \text{ and } p' \cdot x' = w' \text{ by Walras' law.})$



$$p'' = \alpha p + (1 - \alpha)p',$$

$$w'' = p'' \cdot x \quad (= p'' \cdot x').$$

• Write
$$x'' = x(p'', w'')$$
.
• If $p \cdot x'' \ge w$ and $p' \cdot x'' \ge w'$, we would have
 $p'' \cdot x'' = (\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)p') \cdot x''$
 $\ge \alpha w + (1 - \alpha)w'$
 $> \alpha(p \cdot x) + (1 - \alpha)(p' \cdot x)$
(by $p' \cdot x < w'$ and $\alpha < 1$)
 $= p'' \cdot x = w''$,

which contradicts $p'' \cdot x'' \leq w''$.

- Therefore, we have $p \cdot x'' < w$ or $p' \cdot x'' < w'$.
- ▶ If p · x" < w, then combined with p" · x = w", WARP* implies that x = x", and therefore, p · x < w, which contradicts Walras' law.
- If p' ⋅ x'' < w', then combined with p'' ⋅ x' = w'', WARP* implies that x' = x'', and therefore, p' ⋅ x' < w', which contradicts Walras' law.

Compensated Law of Demand

Proposition 2.5

Suppose that the demand function x(p, w) satisfies Walras' law. Then x(p, w) satisfies the WARP if and only if the following condition (the "compensated law of demand") holds: For any (p, w) and (p', w') where $w' = p' \cdot x(p, w)$, we have

$$(p'-p) \cdot (x(p',w') - x(p,w)) \le 0, \tag{*}$$

with strict inequality whenever $x(p,w) \neq x(p',w')$.

▶ In particular, if
$$p'_{\ell} > p_{\ell}$$
 and $p'_{k} = p_{k}$ for all $k \neq \ell$, then $x_{\ell}(p', w') \leq x_{\ell}(p, w)$.

- ► The compensated law of demand is equivalently written as if $p' \cdot x(p, w) = w'$, then $p \cdot x(p', w') > p \cdot x(p, w)$ whenever $x(p, w) \neq x(p', w')$.
- Under Walras' law, this is equivalent to WARP by Proposition 2.4.

Slutsky Matrix

• Let $t \to 0$. Then we have

$$\left. \frac{\partial}{\partial t} v \cdot \left(x(p+tv,(p+tv) \cdot x(p,w)) - x(p,w) \right) \right|_{t=0} \leq 0.$$

The left hand side is equal to

$$v \cdot S(p, w)v$$
,

where

$$S(p,w) = D_p x(p,w) + D_w x(p,w) x(p,w)^{\mathrm{T}} \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times L}.$$

· · · Slutsky matrix

•
$$(\ell, k)$$
th entry:

$$s_{\ell k}(p,w) = \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial p_k}(p,w) + \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial w}(p,w)x_k(p,w)$$

► Thus, we have

$$v \cdot S(p, w) v \leq 0$$
 for all $v \in \mathbb{R}^L$,

or S(p, w) is negative semi-definite.

Proposition 2.6

If the demand function x(p, w) satisfies Walras' law and WARP, then for any (p, w), the Slutsky matrix S(p, w) is negative semi-definite (i.e., $v \cdot S(p, w)v \leq 0$ for all $v \in \mathbb{R}^L$).

Proposition 2.7

If the demand function x(p, w) is homogeneous of degree zero and satisfies Walras' law, then for any (p, w), S(p, w)p = 0 and $p^{T}S(p, w) = 0^{T}$.

- Recall from Propositions 2.1 (homogeneity), 2.2 and 2.3 (Walras' law):
 - $D_p x(p,w)p + D_w x(p,w)w = 0$

•
$$x(p,w)^{\mathrm{T}} + p^{\mathrm{T}}D_p x(p,w) = 0^{\mathrm{T}}$$

 $\blacktriangleright \ p^{\mathrm{T}} D_w x(p,w) = 1$

• If L = 2, this proposition says that for all (p, w),

$$\begin{pmatrix} s_{11} & s_{12} \\ s_{21} & s_{22} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix},$$
$$(p_1 \quad p_2) \begin{pmatrix} s_{11} & s_{12} \\ s_{21} & s_{22} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

which implies that $s_{12} = s_{21}$.

I.e., S(p, w) is symmetric if L = 2.

For L > 2, S(p, w) is not necessarily symmetric.

Exercise 2.E.1

$$L = 3$$

$$x_1(p, w) = \frac{p_2}{p_1 + p_2 + p_3} \frac{w}{p_1}$$

$$x_1(p, w) = \frac{p_3}{p_1 + p_2 + p_3} \frac{w}{p_2}$$

$$x_1(p, w) = \frac{p_1}{p_1 + p_2 + p_3} \frac{w}{p_3}$$

- Verify that x(p, w) is homogeneous of degree zero and satisfies Walras' law.
- Compute s_{12} and s_{21} (where $s_{\ell k} = \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial x_{\ell}}{\partial w} x_k$).

Choice-Based versus Preference-Based

Choice-based approach:

- 1. Under homogeneity and Walras' law, WARP is equivalent to the compensated law of demand.
- 2. It implies negative semi-definiteness of S(p, w).
- 3. These assumptions do not imply symmetry of S(p, w), except in the case of L = 2.
- Preference-based approach:

We will show that symmetry of ${\cal S}(p,w)$ is derived by preference maximization.

Example 2.F.1

$$\begin{split} &w=8\\ &p^1=(2,1,2),\quad x^1=(1,2,2)\\ &p^2=(2,2,1),\quad x^2=(2,1,2)\\ &p^3=(1,2,2),\quad x^3=(2,2,1) \end{split}$$

- ► Consistent with WARP $(x^i \in B_{p^j,w}, x^j \neq x^i \Rightarrow x^j \notin B_{p^i,w}, i \neq j)$
- ► Revealed preference relation ≿* violates transitivity: x² ≻* x¹, x³ ≻* x², x¹ ≻* x³