5. Choice under Uncertainty

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Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern)

- $ightharpoonup C = \{x_1, \dots, x_N\}$: (finite) set of outcomes
- $\mathcal{L} = \{(p_1, \dots, p_N) \in \mathbb{R}_+^N \mid p_1 + \dots + p_N = 1\}:$ set of alternatives ("lotteries")
- Compound lotteries

Compound lottery of
$$L=(p_1,\ldots,p_N)$$
 and $L'=(q_1,\ldots,q_N)$: $\alpha L+(1-\alpha)L' \quad (\alpha \in [0,1])$

We identify the compound lottery $\alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L'$ and its reduced probability distribution $(\alpha p_1 + (1 - \alpha)q_1, \dots, \alpha p_N + (1 - \alpha)q_N) \in \mathcal{L}.$

ightharpoonup \succsim : complete and transitive preference relation on ${\cal L}$

Definition 5.1 (Continuity)

 $\succsim \text{ on } \mathcal{L} \text{ satisfies continuity if for all } L, L', L'' \in \mathcal{L}, \\ \{\alpha \in [0,1] \mid \alpha L + (1-\alpha)L' \succsim L''\} \text{ and } \\ \{\alpha \in [0,1] \mid L'' \succsim \alpha L + (1-\alpha)L'\} \text{ are closed.}$

Definition 5.2 (Independence)

 \succsim on $\mathcal L$ satisfies independence if for all $L,L',L''\in\mathcal L$ and $\alpha\in(0,1)$,

$$L \succsim L' \iff \alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L'' \succsim \alpha L' + (1 - \alpha)L''.$$

Independence Axiom

$$N = 3$$

- ► Indifference curves are straight lines:
 - ▶ If $L \sim L'$, then $\alpha L + (1 \alpha)L' \sim L'$.
 - $\qquad \qquad \text{If } L = \alpha L + (1-\alpha)L \sim L' = \alpha L'' + (1-\alpha)L \text{, then } L \sim L''.$
- Indifference lines are parallel to each other.

Expected Utility Theorem

Proposition 5.1

Complete and transitive \succsim on $\mathcal L$ satisfies continuity and independence if and only if there exists a function $u\colon C\to\mathbb R$ such that the function $U\colon \mathcal L\to\mathbb R$ defined by

$$U(L) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i u(x_i) \qquad (L = (p_1, \dots, p_N) \in \mathcal{L})$$

represents \succsim .

Such u is unique up to positive affine transformation (i.e., if u and v are such functions, then v=au+b for some a>0 and b).

► Call *u* a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) function (or Bernoulli function).

This is not a utility function.

ightharpoonup U is a particular utility function that represents \succsim , which is of linear form.

Proof

Outline

- ▶ By finiteness of C and Independence, there are $\overline{L}, \underline{L} \in \mathcal{L}$ such that $\overline{L} \succsim L \succsim \underline{L}$ for all $L \in \mathcal{L}$. (Exercise 6.B.3)
 - Assume $\overline{L} \succ \underline{L}$.
- ▶ By Continuity, for each $L \in \mathcal{L}$, there exists $\alpha \in [0,1]$ such that

$$L \sim \alpha \overline{L} + (1 - \alpha) \underline{L},$$

which is unique by Independence.

- ▶ Define $U: \mathcal{L} \to \mathbb{R}$ by $U(L) = \alpha$.
- ▶ Verify that U represents \succeq .
- ▶ Verify that *U* is linear.
- Let $u(x_i) = U([x_i])$ (where $[x_i] \in \mathcal{L}$ is the degenerate lottery that yields $x_i \in C$ with probability one).

Step 0

▶ By Independence, for all $L, L', L'' \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$,

$$\begin{split} L \succ L' &\Longrightarrow \alpha L + (1-\alpha)L'' \succ \alpha L' + (1-\alpha)L'', \\ L \sim L' &\Longrightarrow \alpha L + (1-\alpha)L'' \sim \alpha L' + (1-\alpha)L''. \end{split} \tag{Ind-1}$$

In particular,

$$L \sim L', \ L'' \sim L''' \Longrightarrow \alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L'' \sim \alpha L' + (1 - \alpha)L'''.$$
 (Ind-3)

Step 1 (Strict betweenness)

▶ By (Ind-1), for all $L, L' \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$,

$$L \succ L' \Longrightarrow L \succ \alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L' \succ L'.$$
 (Bet)

(Let
$$L'' = L$$
 and $L'' = L'$ in (Ind-1).)

Step 2 (Mixture monotonicity)

▶ By (Bet), for all $L, L' \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1]$, if $L \succ L'$, then

$$\alpha L + (1-\alpha)L' \succsim \beta L + (1-\beta)L' \iff \alpha \ge \beta. \quad \text{(Mon)}$$

► \Leftarrow : If $\alpha = \beta$, we have $\alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L' \sim \beta L + (1 - \beta)L'$. Suppose that $\alpha > \beta$. By (Bet), we have

$$\alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L' \succ L'$$
.

Since $\beta/\alpha \in (0,1)$, again by (Bet) we have

$$\alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L' \succ \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \left\{ \alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L' \right\} + \left(1 - \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \right)L' = \beta L + (1 - \beta)L'.$$

➤ ⇒: Contraposition.

Step 3 (Unique mixture intermediate value)

▶ By Continuity (with $L = \overline{L}$, $L' = \underline{L}$, and L'' = L), for each $L \in \mathcal{L}$, there exists $\alpha \in [0,1]$ such that

$$L \sim \alpha \overline{L} + (1 - \alpha) \underline{L}.$$

▶ By (Mon), for each $L \in \mathcal{L}$, there exists a unique $\alpha \in [0,1]$ such that

$$L \sim \alpha \overline{L} + (1 - \alpha) \underline{L}.$$
 (Uni)

▶ Denote the unique such α by α_L .

Step 4 (Utility representation)

- ▶ Define $U: \mathcal{L} \to \mathbb{R}$ by $U(L) = \alpha_L$ for each $L \in \mathcal{L}$.
- ▶ U is a utility function that represents \succeq :

For
$$L, L' \in \mathcal{L}$$
,

$$\begin{split} L &\succsim L' \\ &\iff \alpha_L \overline{L} + (1 - \alpha_L) \underline{L} \succsim \alpha_{L'} \overline{L} + (1 - \alpha_{L'}) \underline{L} \qquad \text{(by (Uni))} \\ &\iff \alpha_L \ge \alpha_{L'} \quad \text{(by (Mon))} \\ &\iff U(L) \ge U(L'). \end{split}$$

Step 5 (Linearity)

► *U* is linear:

$$U(\alpha L + (1-\alpha)L') = \alpha U(L) + (1-\alpha)U(L') \text{ for all } \alpha \in [0,1]:$$

By definition,

$$L \sim U(L)\overline{L} + (1 - U(L))\underline{L}, \quad L' \sim U(L')\overline{L} + (1 - U(L'))\underline{L}.$$

Therefore, by (Ind-3),

$$\alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L' \sim \alpha \left\{ U(L)\overline{L} + (1 - U(L))\underline{L} \right\}$$

$$+ (1 - \alpha)\left\{ U(L')\overline{L} + (1 - U(L'))\underline{L} \right\}$$

$$= \left\{ \alpha U(L) + (1 - \alpha)U(L') \right\} \overline{L}$$

$$+ \left[1 - \left\{ \alpha U(L) + (1 - \alpha)U(L') \right\} \right] \underline{L}.$$

Hence,

$$U(\alpha L + (1 - \alpha)L') = \alpha U(L) + (1 - \alpha)U(L').$$

Step 6 (Expected utility form)

▶ U has an expected utility form: there is a function $u \colon C \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $U(L) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i u(x_i)$ for all $L = (p_1, \dots, p_N) \in \mathcal{L}$:

Define u by $u(x_i) = U([x_i])$.

Then for each $L=(p_1,\ldots,p_N)\in\mathcal{L}$, which is written as $L=\sum_{i=1}^N p_i[x_i]$, by the linearity of U we have

$$U(L) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i U([x_i]) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i u(x_i).$$

Step 7 (Identification)

▶ Let u be as constructed above.

By construction,

$$[x_i] \sim u(x_i)\overline{L} + (1 - u(x_i))\underline{L}.$$

▶ If $V(L) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i v(x_i)$, then for all x_i ,

$$\begin{split} v(x_i) &= V(u(x_i)\overline{L} + (1 - u(x_i))\underline{L}) \\ &= u(x_i)V(\overline{L}) + (1 - u(x_i))V(\underline{L}) \\ &= (V(\overline{L}) - V(\underline{L}))u(x_i) + V(\underline{L}). \end{split}$$

Allais Paradox

- $ightharpoonup C = \{1M, 0.9M, 0\}$
- $L_1 = 0.9[1M] + 0.1[0] L_1' = 1[0.9M]$
- $L_2 = 0.45[1M] + 0.55[0] L_2' = 0.5[0.9M] + 0.5[0]$

Risk Aversion

- $ightharpoonup C=\mathbb{R}_+$: set of monetary outcomes
- \blacktriangleright \mathcal{L} : set of cumulative distribution functions on \mathbb{R}_+
- Expected utility representation:

$$U(F) = \int_0^\infty u(x)dF(x) \qquad (F \in \mathcal{L})$$

 $u: \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}$: vNM function

lacktriangle Assume that u is increasing and continuous.

▶ DM is risk averse if for any $F \in \mathcal{L}$, $1[\int x dF(x)] \succsim F$, i.e.,

$$u\left(\int xdF(x)\right) \ge \int u(x)dF(x).$$

- $\blacktriangleright \iff u \text{ is concave.}$
- ▶ DM is risk neutral if for any $F \in \mathcal{L}$, $1[\int x dF(x)] \sim F$, i.e.,

$$u\left(\int xdF(x)\right) = \int u(x)dF(x).$$

 $\blacktriangleright \iff u \text{ is affine.}$

▶ DM is strictly risk averse if for any nondegenerate $F \in \mathcal{L}$, $1[\int x dF(x)] \succ F$, i.e.,

$$u\left(\int xdF(x)\right) > \int u(x)dF(x).$$

 $\blacktriangleright \iff u$ is strictly concave.

Certainty Equivalent, Risk Premium

- ▶ Certainty equivalent: c(F,u) such that $1[c(F,u)] \sim F$, i.e., $u(C(F,u)) = \int u(x) dF(x)$
- ▶ Risk premium: $RP(F, u) = \int x dF(x) c(F, u)$
- ▶ $RP(F, u) \ge 0$ for all F if and only if DM is risk averse.

Example: Insurance

- $(1-\pi)[w] + \pi[w-D] \qquad (\pi \in (0,1))$
- ▶ Insurance: costs q, pays 1 if the loss D occurs
- $ightharpoonup \alpha$ units of insurance:

$$(1-\pi)[w-q\alpha] + \pi[w-q\alpha-D+\alpha]$$

Expected utility with strictly concave *u*:

$$f(\alpha) = (1 - \pi)u(w - q\alpha) + \pi u(w - q\alpha - D + \alpha)$$

Assume $q = \pi \cdots$ "actuarial fairness" (market clearing condition under free entry of insurance firms)

$$f'(\alpha) = \pi(1-\pi)(u'(w-D+(1-\pi)\alpha) - u'(w-\pi\alpha))$$

•
$$f'(0) = \pi(1-\pi)(u'(w-D) - u'(w)) > 0$$
 by strict concavity

▶ By FOC:

$$u'(w - D + (1 - \pi)\alpha^*) = u'(w - \pi\alpha^*)$$

or

$$w - D + (1 - \pi)\alpha^* = w - \pi\alpha^*$$

▶ Therefore, $\alpha^* = D$,

i.e., under actuarial fairness, DM insures completely.

- ▶ In fact, using FOC is not necessary to reach this conclusion.
- ▶ If $q = \pi$, then the expected wealth is:

$$(1-\pi)(w-\pi\alpha) + \pi(w-\pi\alpha - D + \alpha) = w - \pi D$$

for any α .

▶ Lottery with $\alpha = D$: $1[w - \pi D]$

 \cdots preferred to any nondegenerate lottery by strictly risk averse DM

Absolute/Relative Risk Aversion

- Assume u'(x) > 0 for all x.
- $ightharpoonup r_{\rm A}(x) = -rac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$: coefficient of absolute risk aversion at x
- $ightharpoonup r_{
 m R}(x) = -rac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)}$: coefficient of relative risk aversion at x

- Fix x, and consider the lottery $\frac{1}{2}[x+\varepsilon] + \frac{1}{2}[x-\varepsilon]$.
- ightharpoonup Risk premium $RP(\varepsilon)$ satisfies

$$u(x - RP(\varepsilon)) = \frac{1}{2}u(x + \varepsilon) + \frac{1}{2}u(x - \varepsilon).$$

b By second-order Taylor expansion around $\varepsilon = 0$, we have

$$RP(\varepsilon) \approx \frac{1}{2} \underbrace{\left(-\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}\right)}_{r_{\Lambda}(x)} \varepsilon^{2} \qquad (\varepsilon \approx 0).$$

- ► Consider the lottery $\frac{1}{2}[x+\varepsilon x]+\frac{1}{2}[x-\varepsilon x]$.
- Similarly, we have

$$RP(\varepsilon) \approx \frac{1}{2} \left(-\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)} \right) (\varepsilon x)^2,$$

or

$$\frac{RP(\varepsilon)}{x} \approx \frac{1}{2} \underbrace{\left(-\frac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)}\right)}_{\varepsilon^2} \varepsilon^2.$$

Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) Functions

- $-\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)} = a$ for all x
- ightharpoonup $\Rightarrow u(x) = -\frac{1}{a}e^{-ax}$

(and its positive affine transformations)

Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) Functions

$$-\frac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)} = c \text{ for all } x$$

$$\Rightarrow u(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1-c}x^{1-c} & \text{if } c \neq 1\\ \log x & \text{if } c = 1 \end{cases}$$

(and its positive affine transformations)

► (For each x, $\lim_{c\to 1} \frac{1}{1-c} (x^{1-c} - 1) = \log x$)

First-Order Stochastic Dominance

Definition 5.3

F first-order stochastically dominates G if

$$\int u(x)dF(x) \ge \int u(x)dG(x)$$

for all nondecreasing functions u.

Proposition 5.2

F first-order stochastically dominates G if and only if $F(x) \leq G(x)$ (or equivalently, $1-F(x) \geq 1-G(x)$) for all x.

▶ If
$$F = (p_1, p_2, p_3)$$
, then $\sum u(x_i)p_i = u(x_1) + (u(x_2) - u(x_1))(p_2 + p_3) + (u(x_3) - u(x_2))p_3$.