Topics in Economic Theory (A1, 2020)

OYAMA Daisuke
oyama@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

In this course, we study advanced topics on incomplete information games, in particular on information design. Half of the course will consist of lectures by the instructor and the other half of presentations by students.
Taught in Zoom meetings; refer to UTAS for the URL.

Readings

Correlated equilibrium

• Aumann, R.J. (1974). ``Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67-96.
• Aumann, R.J. (1987). ``Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,'' Econometrica 55, 1-28.
• Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1987). ``Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,'' Econometrica 55, 1391-1402.

Bayes correlated equilibrium/Partial implementation

• *Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2016). ``Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games,'' Theoretical Economics 11, 487-522.
• Taneva, I. (2019). ``Information Design,'' American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, 151-185.
• *Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2019). ``Information Design: A Unified Perspective,'' Journal of Economic Literature 57, 44-95.

Email game, global games/Full implementation with payoff perturbations

• *Rubinstein, A. (1989). ``The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under `Almost Common Knowledge','' American Economic Review 79, 385-391.
• Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993). ``Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,'' Econometrica 61, 989-1018.
• *Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner (2003). ``Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' Journal of Economic Theory 108, 1-44.
• *Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2003). ``Global Games: Theory and Applications,'' in M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and S. J. Turnovsky, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Eighth World Congress, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. [download]
• Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2007). ``Common Belief Foundations of Global Games.''
• Morris, S., H. S. Shin, and M. Yildiz (2016). ``Common Belief Foundations of Global Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory 163, 826-848.
• Basteck, C., T. R. Daniels, and F. Heinemann (2010). ``Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2010-008, Humboldt University.
• Basteck, C., T. R. Daniels, and F. Heinemann (2013). ``Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' Journal of Economic Theory 48, 2620-2637.

Robustness to incomplete information

• *Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997). ``The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,'' Econometrica 65, 1283-1309.
• *Kajii, A. and S. Morris (2020). ``Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey,'' Japanese Economic Review 71, 7-34.
• Kajii, A. and S. Morris (2020). ``Notes on ``Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey'','' Japanese Economic Review 71, 35-41.
• Ui, T. (2001). ``Robust Equilibria of Potential Games,'' Econometrica 69, 1373-1380.
• Morris, S. and T. Ui (2005). ``Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory 124, 45-78.
• Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2009). ``Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1726-1769.
• Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2010). ``Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors,'' Journal of Economic Theory 145, 752-784.
• Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2012). ``On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors,'' Games and Economic Behavior 74, 321-331.
• Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2011). ``On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 683-688.
• *Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2020). ``Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games,'' Econometrica 88, 693-726.
• Morris, S. and T. Ui (2020). ``Incomplete Information Robustness.''

Smallest equilibrium implementation, full implementation

• Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2019), Section 7.1.
• Carroll, G. (2016). ``Informationally Robust Trade and Limits to Contagion,'' Journal of Economic Theory 166, 334-361.
• Mathevet, L., L. Perego, and I. Taneva (2020), ``On Information Design in Games,'' Journal of Political Economy 128, 1370-1404.
• Inostroza N. and A. Pavan (2020), ``Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing.''
• Hoshino, T. (2020). ``Multi-Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty.''
• Li, F., Y. Song, and M. Zhao (2020). ``Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation: Information Design in Coordination Games.''
• *Morris, S., D. Oyama, and S. Takahashi (2020), ``Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games.''

Applications

• Moriya, F. and T. Yamashita (2020). ``Asymmetric-Information Allocation to Avoid Coordination Failure,'' Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 29, 173-186.
• *Halac, M., E. Lipnowski, and D. Rappoport (2020). ``Rank Uncertainty in Organizations.''

Other related papers

• Arieli, I. and Y. Babichenko (2019). ``Private Bayesian Persuasion,'' Journal of Economic Theory 182, 185-217.
• Doval, L. and J. Ely (2020). ``Sequential Information Design.''
• Dworczak, P. and A. Pavan (2020). ``Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion.''
• Galperti, S. and J. Perego (2020). ``Information Systems.''
• Gossner, O. and R. Veiel (2020). ``Strategic Type Spaces and Robustness to Incomplete Information.''
• Leister, C. M., Y. Zenou, and J. Zhou (2020). ``Social Connectedness and Local Contagion.''
• Mathevet, L. and I. Taneva (2020). ``Organized Information Transmission.''
• Sandmann, C. (2020). ``Recursive Information Design.''
• Serrano-Padial, R. (2020). ``Large Games with Heterogeneous Players.''
• Ziegler, G. (2020). ``Adversarial Bilateral Information Design.''

Topics

• Introduction (9/28)
• Correlated Equilibrium (9/28)
• Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (10/1)
• Email Game (10/5)
• Global Games I (10/5, 10/8)
• Global Games II (10/8)
• Robustness to Incomplete Information (10/12)
• Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games (10/15)
• Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games (10/19, 10/22)
• Joint Design of Information and Transfers in a Team Production Problem (10/26)

Student presentations