Topics in Economic Theory (A1, 2024)

OYAMA Daisuke
oyama@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Wednesday, Friday	8:30-10:15
First session	October 2
Class room	203

In this course, we read recent theory papers, mainly on incomplete information games.
Participants take turns to present papers from the reading list (free-riding is not allowed). We do not attempt to read many papers, but rather focus on a small number of papers. Presenters should discuss the assigned paper in detail.

Introduction

Schedule

Date	Paper	Presenter
10/2 (Wed)	(Introduction, lecture)
10/4 (Fri)	(Lecture)
10/9 (Wed)	Morris (2000)	Sasaki
10/11 (Fri)	Morris (2000) Morris and Shin (1998)	Sasaki Okada
10/16 (Wed)	Morris and Shin (1998) Leister, Zenou, and Zhou (2022)	Okada Wu
10/18 (Fri)	Leister, Zenou, and Zhou (2022) Bergemann, Heumann, Morris, Sorokin, and Winter (2022)	Wu Shimoyama
10/23 (Wed)	Bergemann, Heumann, Morris, Sorokin, and Winter (2022) Iijima (2015)	Shimoyama Nakayama
10/25 (Fri)	Iijima (2015)	Nakayama
10/30 (Wed)	Sakovics and Steiner (2012)	Odahara
11/1 (Fri)	Koh, Sanguanmoo, Uzui (2023)	Wang
11/6 (Wed)	Bueno de Mesquita (2010)	Huang, Chen
11/8 (Fri)	Koh and Morris (2022)	Asai

Readings

Email game, global games

*Rubinstein, A. (1989). ``The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under `Almost Common Knowledge','' American Economic Review 79, 385-391.
*Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993). ``Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,'' Econometrica 61, 989-1018.
**Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998). ``Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks,'' American Economic Review 88, 587-597. (10/11)
Heinemann, F. (2000). ``Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment,'' American Economic Review 90, 316-318.
**Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2004). ``Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt,'' European Economic Review 48, 133-153.
**Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2012). ``Contagious Adverse Selection,'' American Economic Jornal: Macroeconomics 4, 1-21.
**Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2010). ``Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs,'' American Political Science Review 104, 446-466. (11/1)
*Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner (2003). ``Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' Journal of Economic Theory 108, 1-44.
Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2003). ``Global Games: Theory and Applications,'' in M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and S. J. Turnovsky, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Eighth World Congress, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. [download]
Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2007). ``Common Belief Foundations of Global Games.''
Morris, S., H. S. Shin, and M. Yildiz (2016). ``Common Belief Foundations of Global Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory 163, 826-848.
Oury, M. and O. Tercieux (2007). ``Contagion in Games with Strategic Complementarities.''
Basteck, C., T. R. Daniels, and F. Heinemann (2010). ``Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2010-008, Humboldt University.
Basteck, C., T. R. Daniels, and F. Heinemann (2013). ``Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,'' Journal of Economic Theory 48, 2620-2637.
**Sakovics, J. and J. Steiner (2012). ``Who Matters in Coordination Problems?'' American Economic Review 102, 3439-3461. (10/25)
**Iijima, R. (2015). ``Iterated Generalized Half-Dominance and Global Game Selection,'' Journal of Economic Theory 159, 120-136. (10/23)
Morris, S., D. Oyama, and S. Takahashi (2023). ``Global Game Selections in Binary-Action Supermodular Games.''
K. Burdzy, D. M. Frankel, and A. Pauzner (2001). ``Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World,'' Econometrica 69, 163-189. [Working paper version]
Frankel, D. and A. Pauzner (2000). ``Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 285-304.
Steiner, J. (2008). ``Coordination Cycles,'' Games and Economic Behavior 63, 308-327.
Steiner, J. (2008). ``Coordination of Mobile Labor,'' Journal of Economic Theory 139, 25-46.

Robustness to incomplete information

Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997). ``The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,'' Econometrica 65, 1283-1309.
Kajii, A. and S. Morris (2020). ``Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey,'' Japanese Economic Review 71, 7-34.
Kajii, A. and S. Morris (2020). ``Notes on ``Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey'','' Japanese Economic Review 71, 35-41.
Ui, T. (2001). ``Robust Equilibria of Potential Games,'' Econometrica 69, 1373-1380.
Morris, S. and T. Ui (2005). ``Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory 124, 45-78.
Haimanko, O. and A. Kajii (2016). ``Approximate Robustness of Equilibrium to Incomplete Information,'' International Journal of Game Theory 45,839-857.
Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2009). ``Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria,'' Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1726-1769.
Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2010). ``Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors,'' Journal of Economic Theory 145, 752-784.
Oyama, D. and O. Tercieux (2012). ``On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors,'' Games and Economic Behavior 74, 321-331.
Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2011). ``On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 683-688.
Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2019). ``Generalized Belief Operator and the Impact of Small Probability Events on Higher Order Beliefs.''
Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2020). ``Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games,'' Econometrica 88, 693-726.
Morris, S. and T. Ui (2020). ``Incomplete Information Robustness.''
Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2023). ``Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games Revisited.''
Morris, S., D. Oyama, and S. Takahashi (2023). ``Strict Robustness to Incomplete Information,'' Japanese Economic Review 74, 357-376.

Information design

Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2016). ``Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games,'' Theoretical Economics 11, 487-522.
Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2019). ``Information Design: A Unified Perspective,'' Journal of Economic Literature 57, 44-95.
Kamien, M. I., Y. Tauman, and S. Zamir (1990). ``On the Value of Information in a Strategic Conflict,'' Games and Economic Behavior 2, 129-153.
**Carroll, G. (2016). ``Informationally Robust Trade and Limits to Contagion,'' Journal of Economic Theory 166, 334-361.
Mathevet, L., L. Perego, and I. Taneva (2020). ``On Information Design in Games,'' Journal of Political Economy 128, 1370-1404.
Hoshino, T. (2022). ``Multi-Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty,'' International Economic Review 63, 755-776.
Inostroza N. and A. Pavan (2023). ``Adversarial Coordination and Public Information Design.''
Li, F., Y. Song, and M. Zhao (2023). ``Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation,'' Journal of Economic Theory 207, 105575.
Morris, S., D. Oyama, and S. Takahashi (2024). ``Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games,'' Econometrica 92, 775-813.
Morris, S., D. Oyama, and S. Takahashi (2022). ``Implementation via Information Design using Global Games.''
Gossner, O. and R. Veiel (2022). ``Rationalizable Outcome Distributions.''
**Koh, A., S. Sanguanmoo, and K. Uzui (2023). ``Full Dynamic Implementation.'' (10/30)

Information and mechanism design

**Dirk Bergemann, D., T. Heumann, S. Morris, D. Sorokin, and E. Winter (2022). ``Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions,'' American Economic Review: Insights 4, 371-388. (10/18)
Dirk Bergemann, D., T. Heumann, and S. Morris (2022). ``Screening with Persuasion.''
Dirk Bergemann, D., T. Heumann, and S. Morris (2024). ``Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions.''
Pei, H. and B. Strulovici (2023). ``Robust Implementation with Costly Information.''

Local interaction games

Morris, S. (1997). ``Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching.''
Morris, S. (1999). ``Potential Methods in Interaction Games.''
**Morris, S. (2000). ``Contagion,'' Review of Economic Studies 67, 57-78. (10/9)
Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2005). ``Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games.''
Oyama, D. and S. Takahashi (2015). ``Contagion and Uninvadability in Local Interaction Games: The Bilingual Game and General Supermodular Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory 157, 100-127.
**Leister, C. M., Y. Zenou, and J. Zhou (2022). ``Social Connectedness and Local Contagion,'' Review of Economic Studies 89, 372-410. (10/16)
Erol, S., F. Parise, and A. Teytelboym (2023). ``Contagion in Graphons,'' Journal of Economic Theory 211, 105673.
**Koh, A. and S. Morris (2022). ``Speed vs Resilience in Contagion.'' (11/6)

(To be updated; * discussed in lectures; ** cadidates for student presentations)

Slides

Email Game (10/2)
Global Games (10/4)

Office hours

Friday 14:00-15:30

Economics Research Building 10th floor, 1012