Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Binary Supermodular Games

Daisuke Oyama
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Satoru Takahashi
Department of Economics, Princeton University


Josef Hofbauer
Department of Mathematics, University of Vienna

This paper studies equilibrium selection in binary supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. We provide complete characterizations of absorbing and globally accessible equilibria and apply them to two subclasses of games. First, for unanimity games, it is shown that our selection criterion is not in agreement with that in terms of Nash products, and an example is presented in which two strict Nash equilibria are simultaneously globally accessible when the friction is sufficiently small. Second, a class of games with invariant diagonal are proposed and shown to generically admit an absorbing and globally accessible equilibrium for small frictions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
Key Words: equilibrium selection; perfect foresight dynamics; supermodular game; strategic complementarity; unanimity game; invariant diagonal game.

International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (2011), 251-267.
This version: August 17, 2010. PDF file
(Older version: June 8, 2009. PDF file)